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INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR MANAGING
WATER CONFLICTS AND THE ROLE OF TRANSACTION COSTS*
K. William Easter**
Where there are people,  there  is water--and conflict over water.
Conflicts between sectors, such  as agriculture,  industry, urban water
supply and sanitation, fishery, navigation, environmental preservation and
recreation, have become increasingly acute because of the burgeoning world
population along with rapid economic  growth and an accelerating concern
for environmental quality.1 The severity of these conflicts is  aggravated
by lags  in the development of institutions  governing water use.2
Unfortunately water  is  an excellent vector for externalities.  One
person or entity's water use commonly affects  the quantity and/or quality
of water used by others.  Thus conflicts abound over both the  quantity of
water used and its quality.  There are growing conflicts over water use
particularly between urban and rural users.  The question is whether or
not  the conflicts will reach the stage posed by Marc Reisner's title of a
*This paper is based on an article by James E. Nickum and K. William
Easter, "Institutional Arrangements for Managing Water conflicts  in Lake
Basins" published in Natural Resources Forum, August 1990, 40p.
**Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of
Minnesota.  I want to  thank John Waelti for his thoughtful comments  on an
earlier draft.
1 Within use sectors,  of course,  there are conflicts,  such as  those
between groups which share a scarce supply in sequence,  or which overuse
an open access resource  at  the same time  (e.g. lake fishery),  or which
have differential access to key  inputs.
2 For examples  from the western United States,  see Vaux (1986), Young
(1986),  and Thompson (1987).
1recent article on the problem in the American West;  will the next war be
between the cities  and agriculture  (Reisner, 1988-89)?
Many, perhaps most, of these  conflicts will be resolved politically,
guided by economic values and economic and social institutions.  This
paper briefly reviews  some of the conflicts over water use and considers
different institutional and organizational arrangements and policy tools
which have been or could be of use  in conflict management, including
market and government based approaches  as well as collective action by
water users.  Central to  the  success of such arrangements will be the
level of transaction costs.
WATER QUALITY CONFLICTS
Concerns about water quality have been growing since the 1960s.  At
first, attention centered on surface water pollution from point sources,
but new information now indicates  that ground water and sediment pollution
from non-point sources  are,  at least, equally serious problems.
Water pollution of rivers  and streams has the  important characteristic
of allowing polluters  to avoid the effects of their pollution.  The
effluent is dumped into the river and carried downstream where others must
bear the damages.  In contrast,  it is more difficult for ground water or
lake polluters  to avoid damaging their own operations, as  Chicago  found
out a century ago:
From its  inception, Chicago drew its water from Lake Michigan
and dumped its wastes  into  the Chicago River running through  the
heart of Chicago and, prior to  1900,  into the  lake.  The problem was
obvious:  Chicago was polluting its own water supply.  The problem
intensified as  the city grew, and in 1885 a typhoid and cholera
epidemic claimed 12  percent of the city's population  (Easter and
Waelti, 1980, p. 128).
2Chicago was able to  "solve"  its waste disposal problem by digging a
costly canal, completed in 1900, to  reverse the  flow of the  Chicago River
so  that it emptied into a branch of the  Illinois River,  itself a tributary
of the Mississippi.  Until the Chicago Sanitary District added treatment
plants  in 1922,  the diversion "created a problem of catastrophic
proportions  for the river and its backwater lakes above  Peoria",  a stretch
of some 250 km. (Stout, 1985, pp.  172-173).  Not all  lake users  are as
favorably situated as Chicago to find acceptable alternatives for
disposal.  The Mississippi basin  is only a few miles from the city, and
the divide between them is  less than three meters high.
The more contemporary story of Waukegan, Illinois, just north of
Chicago, has a less happy ending, at least so  far.  Polychlorinated
biphenyl  (PCB) accumulations in  the city's artificial harbor on Lake
Michigan have  led to a ban on fishing and dredging.  The  subsequent
buildup of silt effectively blocked the  city's harbor  (Ashworth, 1986, pp.
176-179).
Sources and Cost of Pollution
Many times, pollution problems are magnified by the variability
of water supply over  time.  Dry periods can concentrate the pollutants
while heavy rainfall events can accelerate soil erosion.  Irrigation
investments which are made to deal with drought problems may in some cases
add to pollution problems.  For example, irrigation may cause the leaching
of nutrients and herbicides into the  ground water, particularly in areas
such as  the sand plains of Minnesota.
3Benefits from controlling or cleaning up water pollution are measured
in  terms of damages prevented.  These damages affect a wide range of
users, including municipal, agricultural, recreational, and industrial
water users.  The damages  to municipalities include  the  increased cost of
water treatment, the  cost of developing new sources of water, greater
health treatment costs and lower productivity of the  labor force  (days
sick increase).  Agricultural damages come from salt accumulation that
reduces  crop yields and toxic chemicals.
A wide range of water-based recreational activities, such as fishing,
swimming, and boating, are all affected by water quality.  This is
particularly important for Minnesota, with its 10,000 lakes and a large
tourism industry.  Increased pollution of Minnesota's  recreational water
could be disastrous to  its economy.
These pollution costs have  led to a number of conflicts.  One  is  the
conflict between industrial and municipal polluters and recreational
water users.  In response to this  conflict, many billions of dollars have
been spent in the U.S.  on programs to  install and improve municipal
treatment facilities.  Second is  the growing conflict between farmers and
recreational water users.  This conflict not only influenced the U.S. farm
bill  including provisions concerning wetlands, but it also helped spawn
state programs  such as RIM program.  Third is  the conflict between farmers
and users or potential users of ground water.  As measurement of ground
water quality has improved, it has become evident that agriculture is
polluting ground water with herbicides and nitrates.  Finally, there is  a
growing potential for conflict among states and even countries  over
pollution control regulations.  Will states or countries with strong
4environmental regulations  lose  their competitive  edge to  those with few
regulations?
WATER QUANTITY CONFLICTS
Conflicts over water quantity occur (1) when water levels decline or
increase significantly due  to natural conditions  or upstream activities;
(2) when significant withdrawals,  often involving interbasin transfers or
pumping of groundwater, are made;  (3) when the discharge, and therefore
the level, of a lake  can be regulated in accordance with preset operating
rules;  and (4) when population and economic growth catapult water demands
beyond existing supply capacity.  When water with desirable properties
becomes scarce, due  to either quality or quantity factors, the high degree
of interdependency among water users  intensifies conflict and can cause
market failure.  Thus water resource development has  long been an arena
for collective  action or  government intervention.
Conflicts  arise, particularly in dry periods when water withdrawals
are large and supplies are  low.  For example during the Minnesota drought
of 1988  there was a conflict between the Twin Cities and those living
around two northern lakes over the release of lake water  to increase  the
flow in the Mississippi River.  Only a timely rain dampened this conflict.
A second conflict arose as  the dry conditions  in Minnesota continued into
1989  and lake levels dropped.  Lake Minnetonka landowners wanted to use
ground water  to  increase the lake  level but other users of the  ground
water argued this was  a low priority use.  Another conflict resulting from
the  1988  drought was among Great Lakes states over the  release of Lake
Michigan water into  the Chicago river to increase  stream flows  downstream.
Fourth the  growth of urban areas particularly in Asia has intensified
5urban-rural conflicts.  Urban areas  are increasingly going to  irrigated
rural areas to obtain their water supplies resulting in the  drying up of
some rural communities.  Finally, there is  the conflict between irrigators
using ground water and other well owners.  Minnesota's permit system for
wells has helped reduce  these latter conflicts  (Lotterman and Waelti,
1983).  Thus,  conflicts arise between rural and urban water users, between
recreational and agricultural water users, between upstream and
downstream water users, and between municipal and recreational water
users.  These conflicts will certainly reoccur particularly  iuring dry
periods, unless institutional  or  organization arrangements  are developed
to help resolve them.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Many of these conflicts  over water arise because one person or.firm
influences  the production or utility another person or firm receives  from
water, and this  influence  is unintended.  Consequently the affected party
wants to control  this  influence.  Thus  there are strong incentives to
develop institutions  that alter the response  of others or define rights
and duties  in the form of rules  that provide information concerning how
others will use the water.  In the absence of institutional arrangements,
such conflicts  are, many times,  resolved in the courts which involves very
high costs and have resulted, at best, in ad hoc decisions.
Transactions Costs
To develop new institutional arrangements  to resolve many of the water
conflicts  is not easy.  New institutions must be developed, specified,
6negotiated, enforced and widely accepted by users.  These  costs
associated with institutional development and implementation are what is
generally termed transaction costs  (Williamson,  1985).  "In a modern
economy, the transactions  industry is  quite massive.  It
includes....agents of all kinds,  attorneys, the police and the judicial
system, and the  large and growing private sector enforcement systems"
(Randall, 1987, p.  158).
Transaction costs have been described as  the  "costs  of running  the
economic system" (Arrow 1969, p. 48).  These costs range from the simple
search cost involved in many market exchanges all  the way to the  costs of
changing institutional arrangements.  For new institutions information
must be obtained concerning the specific nature of problems  to be
addressed, such as  the  location, nature and magnitude of point and non-
point sources of pollution and their effect on water and sediments.
Increasingly for water transactions, detailed hydrological data are
required, as well  as  information on a wide  range of difficult to measure
pollutants.
High transaction costs that perpetuate  inefficient externalities and
water conflicts are found in many different situations.  For instance,
many countries have weak judicial and enforcement systems that will
require  extensive development before new institutional arrangements can be
effective.  For example, establishing and implementing private water
rights in such countries would be expensive.
"One may ask why economies based on free enterprise so often
handle  the nonexclusiveness problem by establishing some form of
common property institutions rather than nonattentuated property
rights.  The answer may lie  in  the traditional belief that private
ownership is  inappropriate for certain kinds of resources.  More
often, I suspect, the answer may be found in the high cost of
7establishing and enforcing private property arrangements.  Where
many users  share a common fishery or a large oil or groundwater
pool, the costs of specifying and enforcing traditional property
rights may exceed any gains that might arise from market
transactions thus permitted."  [Randall, 1988, p.  22]
However, as water resources become more  scarce  (valuable) and conflicts
intensify, it becomes  increasingly worthwhile to specify and enforce water
rights.
Transaction costs can occur within any part of a water system starting
with the water source and ending when water is  delivered to the  consumer
and then returned to the  environment.  In the process the water may be
stored and treated before being conveyed to the  consumer.  Also in many
cases  the consumer has  a meter through which the water flows  indicating
how much has been used and must be paid for.  Within this system we  can
think of a number of important transformation points where transactions
could or do  take place.  It  is  at these  transformation points where
transaction costs are likely to occur.
The first transformation point involves planning for and obtaining the
water supply at the  source.  This may involve putting in a pump, building
a reservoir or buy water from some existing users.  Here both budget
concerns  and conflicts with other sectors become important.  Transaction
costs can vary depending on institutional and organizational arrangements
already in place for allowing different alternative  sources of supply to
be used.  The transaction costs will also be dependent on the number of
government agencies  involved in  the decisions concerning the water supply.
A second transformation point will occur at  the storage facility.
Here decisions must be made concerning how the water will be allocated
among users.  Once  the facility  is  in place water management becomes of
8overriding concern.  Competition for funds  to support system operation and
maintenance is  a potential area of high transaction costs.
The next transaction is  the  delivery of water to  the consumer.  It  is
through leakage in the delivery system that much water is  wasted and
contaminated.  Water contamination is particularly bad when water is
supplied only intermittently.  The high transaction costs at  this stage
involves budget competition for funds  to upgrade the  delivery system and
provide continuous water service.  Replacing the  delivery system is very
expensive and may involve a number of public agencies.  Another  important
transactions  cost at  this  stage involves unauthorized hook ups and
"stealing" of water which in turn requires policing and penalties to
discourage stealing.
A similar transaction cost occurs at  the point water goes through the
water meter into the household or business firm.  Meters are by-passed or
disconnected to keep water charges  low.  In a number of cases water fees
are just ignored.  In  these cases  the transaction costs includes the  cost
of policing the  system to prevent tampering with water meters and
nonpayment of fees.  Also included would be  the cost of collecting fees
and the cost of disconnecting  (turning off) water to those not paying
their  fees.  The cost of building a system so  that nonpaying users could
be disconnected is  a transaction cost.
As one moves from one part of the water system to  another the agency
in charge may change.  For example, the  irrigation and power department
may be  in charge of the water source  i.e.  reservoir while the revenue
department installs  the water meters  and collects  fees.  Such separation
of responsibility within the water system can effect incentives and raise
9transaction costs.  The agency that has responsibility for water delivery
may lack incentives  to provide good service unless  they also must collect
water fees  to  support their activities.  Satisfied customers  are much
easier to collect fees  from than dissatisfied customers.
Although transaction costs are important  in determining whether or not
institutional and organizational arrangements are developed to resolve
resource conflicts, ordinary production and construction costs will  also
be important.  The question  is what strategy will minimize these costs
over time.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND POLICY TOOLS
FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT
Institutional and organizational arrangements for resolving conflicts
in water use can be grouped under three  general headings.  One  is  the
increasingly popular approach of establishing markets.  The second is  the
most widely used approach which relies on government or quasi-government
agencies  to directly manage water use and allocation.  The third and final
category which can complement the other two,  involves  collective action by
water users.  This can be by means of either formal or informal  groups of
water users or concerned citizens.
Market Based Solutions
The role of the market as a dispute resolution device has  long been
recognized by economists.  For example, Grossman (1974, p. 64) notes:
The market is....a social mechanism for the  relocation of
conflicts  at a relatively 'low' level....
It  localizes ordinary economic business conflicts,  settles
them in the market place, and keeps  them from migrating up  to the
higher levels of the political structure, as would be  inevitable in
10a hierarchically organized economy....
The market mechanism's very impersonality, often and at  times
justly criticized, has its positive side.  The market respects
economic worth and purchasing power whatever direction it may come,
and thereby tends to provide economic opportunities where they might
otherwise be barred by social or political prejudice.
Young (1985)  describes  some of the  characteristics of water which make
it difficult to develop institutional  arrangements  for market exchange of
water or water rights.  One of the key characteristics which we have
already discussed above is  the  pervasive interdependency among users.
Other important attributes  include resource mobility, economies of scale
in large water projects, variability in supply and demand, and
conflicting social values concerning water.  An additional problem is  the
high cost of making transactions when there are a large number of water
users involved.
Water Markets
In cases where interdependence among water users  is  limited, an
efficient market system can improve water allocation and utilization.
However, to establish such a market requires several key institutional
arrangements.  First, water rights and responsibilities  for  the use and
transfer of water must be established.  Until this  is  done, markets will
be greatly constrained.  A second step  is  to improve  the  information
system concerning water supplies and demand.  This  is  particularly
important  if certain uses are dependent on the level of stream flows (in
stream uses) or low priority water rights do not get water during
droughts or low flow periods.  Finally, the water delivery system should
be operated so  that users  can buy and sell water throughout  the system.
In other words, the rules  for water delivery must be flexible enough so
11that trades or sales do not require extensive bargaining among many users
which involve high transactions costs  (Easter, 1986).  For small or highly
segmented systems,  too limited a set of trading opportunities may exist
i.e.  only one  or two private  suppliers.  In such cases, market power, when
allowed to operate, may become  too highly concentrated.  When this occurs,
alternative sources of supply should be developed.
New Mexico's water law seems  to meet many of these requirements  for an
efficient decentralized market allocation of water.  It allows
reallocation of water to new uses  at new sites,  guarantees  the uses
covered by the rights and minimizes  the impact of changes  in water use on
the  rights of others.  [Nunn,  1990]  However, it is  not clear how non-
traditional rights will be counted such as in stream water uses and
seepage that  support wetlands.  The key question is what  is  a detrimental
effect on existing rights and what are the  existing rights.  These
questions will probably have to be answered in the  courts which will raise
future transaction costs.  The more completely defined the water rights,
the lower  the transactions  costs of water sales.
In contrast, South Dakota's law does not seem to provide the same
protection against adverse impacts on the rights of other water users.
For example, during the energy crisis  in the  1970s South Dakota sold
Missouri river water to  the ETSI pipeline company for a coal slurry
pipeline from Wyoming to Arkansas.  Thus water would have been transferred
to another river basin.  This was a sale between two parties which ignored
possible  losses to downstream users particularly in drought years.  Only
the drop  in oil prices and the failure of the ETSI pipeline company to
build the pipeline prevented the water transfer and avoided the
12transaction costs of an external court battle over  the sale.
Tradeable Permits
A market medium that is  being used more widely, particularly in the
case of air pollution, is  the  tradeable permit.  A given level  of
permissible effluent discharge  is  determined by a pollution control
agency.  This  fixed discharge  is  then allocated among firms based either
on willingness  to pay or on past discharge  levels.  The firms can then buy
and sell the permits, depending on their need and the permit price.  This,
of course, encourages the development and adoption of technology that
reduces pollution so that a firm does not have  to buy a permit or
additional permits.  Such permits  tend to work best for easily monitored
point sources of pollution because of low transactions  costs.
Issuing permits is  one way to establish comparable water rights.
People sometimes oppose permit systems because they do not want to
establish rights to pollute.  Yet with a permit system the cost of
controlling and reallocating the pollution so  that damages can be reduced
would be lower.  Control could be maintained by issuing pollution permits
for a limited period of time, although this would limit their efficiency.
Effluent rights trading  is not  theoretically the best method of
achieving a socially optimum combination of output and hazard.  That would
require "exposure trading", where  the degree of harm caused by effluents
is  taken into account (Rousmasset and Smith, 1990).  The information
requirements  and thus  transaction costs  of exposure trading are much
higher than for effluent rights  trading, however.
Water permits have been used to help manage  irrigation well
13development in Minnesota.  The current permit system has helped resolve a
number of conflicts over well interference without large transaction
costs, but the permits are not tradeable  (Lotterman and Waelti,  1983).  In
areas with declining ground water levels due  to pumping, tradeable permits
would be one way to encourage water conservation and limit the amount of
water withdrawn.  One of the  transaction costs involved in  implementing
such a permit system would be to determine how much water it  is  safe to
withdraw over time and to develop a procedure to allocate this  amount
amongst permit holders.  Once the  allocation is made,  then those needing
additional water could buy permits from the owners.  As  the demand for
water increases,  so would the price of the permits, which would further
encourage conservation.
Bargaining to Reduce Water Pollution
Coase  (1960) and others have shown that bargaining can bring about a
socially optimum level of pollution when transactions costs are zero.
Within a lake or above a small confined aquifer,  this may be quite
appropriate  if there are only a few polluters and a few users being
damaged.  When there are many actors  involved, bargaining is  limited by
excessive transactions  costs.
One key decision that must be made  is who has what rights.  Do the
polluting firms and farms have the right to discharge  their effluents or
do water users have the  right to clean water?  Whoever has  the  rights will
determine who pays  for the disposal system.  In U.S.  cities, we solved the
problem by making the  taxpayers (via the state and federal governments)
pay most of the cost of building the waste disposal systems:  ninety
14percent in many cases.
For bargaining to  take place among water users,  they need to have  a
common interest  in doing so.  Institutions need to be  developed that allow
the different interests  to form separate bargaining units.  For example, a
law might be enacted that gives downstream water users  special rights to
organize and take  legal action against upstream polluters.  The threat of
legal action would provide upstream users, who are damaging the water
source, with an incentive  to bargain over pollution levels.
For bargaining to result in a relatively efficient and equitable
solution, all affected parties must be accounted for and information
concerning the  levels of pollution and their effect must be readily
available.  Some impartial  group or agency must collect  information over
time concerning levels of pollution and the extent of damage  it causes.
We also need to know how changes in practices affect pollution levels so
that they can be related back to potential reductions  in damages.  This  is
no  small task, either technically or organizationally.  So  far, the
biggest gap in our knowledge appears to be in determining the  damage
costs.  This  is  particularly true for the  longer term cumulative impacts
of pollution.
Government Based Solutions
Even where markets are allowed to  operate fully, government
involvement will be necessary to resolve major disputes, provide technical
information and set the rules for markets themselves.  For example, where
rights  to water use are not well specified, a major responsibility of
government would be  to delineate those rights  (and the duties such as
15payment of taxes and fees which are attached to them) and to make an
initial assignment of rights  to individuals,  groups or government
agencies.  Furthermore, market based mechanisms such as  administrative
water pricing can and are used, by some government agencies.  Market and
government based solutions  are not mutually exclusive.
Nonmarket Failure and Special  Interests
Even though problems  of market failure have often provided a
justification for establishing nonmarket means  for regulating and
allocating water use--in particular, to involve government agencies,
conflicts and inefficiency, arise as well from defects  in the use of
nonmarket institutions and organizations.  Virtually all of the  sources of
market failure are also present in many nonmarket situations:  (1) lack of
specification and transferability of water rights;  (2) conflicts
(especially between administrative units) over return flows;  (3) rent
seeking behavior;  and  (4) high transaction costs.
Rent seeking by special interest groups has always been a concern in
government operated water systems.  When high economic rents are at stake,
individuals,  groups of  individuals and firms have a strong incentive to
influence government action.3 This rent-seeking behavior can result in a
misuse of resources and involve political manipulation (Gould and Amaro-
Reyes,  1983).  The  rents tend to be captured by those with political power
and relatively high incomes.  Once  the rents have been captured, the
owners have  the  funds and incentives  to make  defensive expenditures to
3.  "Rent is  ... defined to be  that part of a person's  or firm's
income which is  above  the minimum amount necessary to keep  that person or
firm in its  given occupation."  (Henderson and Quandt, 1980, pp. 151-152.)
16protect  their rights.  Over time, the mechanisms by which successful rent-
seekers  obtain their gains become entrenched and are extremely well
defended making the transaction cost  of institutional  changes very high
(Repetto, 1986).  A good example of this has been the economic rents
created by federal irrigation projects in Western U.S.,  that have been
captured by a relatively small number of farmers.  In fact  the economic
rents have encouraged farmers to  devise ways  to evade the  acreage
limitations for decades.
Based in part on Wolf's 1979  theory of nonmarket failure,  there are  a
number of areas where institutional or organizational changes could be
used to  improve agency water management.  These  include adjustments  in the
incentive structure  for managers and lower level agency personnel;  staff
training;  improved communications within each agency, between agencies,
and between agencies  and users;  improved information retrieval, processing
and sharing;  and developing means  for establishing accountability.  In
general, since  the number of users and agencies involved in water
management  is  large, accountability arrangements are difficult to devise.
Quality problems further complicate matters, particularly concerning
information, as  does  the highly variable water supply.
Finally, in actually drafting new institutional approaches to deal
with water problems, we should try to answer  the  following questions
suggested by Wolf, 1979:
1. Can desirable outcomes such as water conservation and reduced
pollution be obtained by making relatively easy changes  in the
operation of existing market mechanisms?
172. Can nonmarket policies be devised which retain useful market
characteristics, such as valuing water at its marginal value product?
3. Can suitable measures for nonmarket outputs be devised which will then
be used to measure performance and help  improve water allocation
decisions?
4. Can agency standards and goals be changed to align agency behavior,
including personnel practices, more closely with the  intended output
such as  the timely delivery of water?
5. Can improved information, feedback, and monitoring and evaluation
systems be built into new policies, programs and operating rules, so
that the risks of co-optation of water benefits by 'client'  groups are
reduced?  (Wolf, 1979, pp. 136-137).
SuDDlv Oriented Solutions
The traditional government approach to conflicts over water use  is  to
build another project, or to build one designed to deliver an amount of
water sufficient to meet the  "needs" of all relevant users.  The
.struction  of multi-stage municipal water treatment facilities mentioned
earlier is  an example.  Reservoir projects designed to  increase stream
discharges during low flow periods  is  another illustration.  A  final
illustration involves the building of a new reservoir for Tianjin by the
Chinese central government after Beijing claimed exclusive  rights to a
reservoir that had served both municipalities.  This alternative may have
had the lowest transaction costs for the government but it  involved
substantial construction and operating costs.
18The supply-oriented approach tries to take  advantage of economies of
scale, and low transaction costs.  It  is  also politically popular for a
state, particularly if the federal government pays most of the costs.  Yet
it is  expensive, with the costs usually borne  in large  part by
nonbeneficiaries  (tax payers),  and it is  prone  to nonmarket failure  (e.g.
inadequate provision for maintenance and high economic  rents generated).
In the case of water pollution a superior strategy is  to actually
reduce the  discharge of effluents into  the environment.  This  is  the only
really effective approach for dealing with nonpoint pollution problems,
particularly in the case of ground water.  For example, methods  of
cropping, timber harvesting, road building and grazing must all be
adjusted to reduce  soil erosion and chemical  contamination.  This can be
achieved by using a wide range of possible institutional arrangements  and
implementation tools,  including subsidies,  taxes,  land use regulations,
land retirement, regulation of farming practices, zoning and outright
bans.
In a number of cases, reducing nonpoint pollution means a reduction of
economic activity upstream.  Those affected may be faced with difficult
choices  concerning changes  in their production enterprises.  With
appropriate research and extension, new crops or  industries could be
introduced that are  less polluting.  Nonetheless, upstream-downstream
conflicts  are often difficult to solve, especially in the absence of
effective basin-wide planning and cost-sharing by all beneficiaries.
19Inaction
Problems of nonmarket failure suggests  that the Chinese Taoist
(Daoist) philosopher Laozi may have been right when he counselled kings
that the best way to  rule was  often to not intervene  in the  natural course
of events.  Where conflict resolution mechanisms  exist in society,
government involvement may be redundant or even an impediment.  For
example, if there  is a possibility of a subsidized, supply-oriented
government solution to a local conflict over water use, water users are
less  likely to work out an accommodation among themselves which would
require them to reduce  their water use;  and they are less  likely to build
projects on their own.  If government resources  for support are limited,
as  they usually are, water users  (including local and state governments)
will often prefer to wait their turn or devote  their resources  to  lobbying
efforts.
The U.S. Corps of Engineers used the nonintervention approach in the
summer  of 1988 when they responded to  the Governor of Minnesota's request
to  increase  the flow of water into the Mississippi from two northern
Minnesota lakes.  They studied the problem until it rained, and then
concluded that no action was necessary.
Regulations and Prohibitions
One of the most common approaches used by government to  deal with
pollution problems has been to establish regulations or prohibitions.  A
good example of this approach  is  the prohibitions  against wetlands
drainage established in the  1985 Food Security Act called the Swampbuster
provision.  If farmers drain wetlands and plant commodity program crops on
20them, they may lose all  the  federal farm program payments.  For example, a
North Dakota farmer planted wheat on two-tenths  of an acre of wetlands.
Since his administrative appeal was  turned down he could lose all of his
1989 program payments of $25,000.  This has encouraged some  in the U.S.
Congress  to call for a change in the  law so that the penalty of such small
"mistakes" are not subject  to so savage a penalty.
On the other  side of the  issue the Wildlife Management Institute
argues that the  Swampbuster provision is  not effective and wetlands
continue  to be drained at  alarming rates.  They argue  that the problem
stems from the  fact that farmers can continue  to get farm program payments
and drain wetlands as long as they do not plant commodity program crops on
them.  This could be stopped they argue by making wetlands drainage by
itself a violation of Swampbuster.  Even so, policing and enforcing such a
law would be information intensive and subject to evasion which would
result in high transaction costs.  The economic  rents  involved are high
enough to encourage all  types of strategic behavior by farmers.
An alternative  strategy would be for the government to purchase the
drainage rights  to selected wetlands.  Farmers would be compensated
directly for the  loss in rights and would be more likely to  cooperate.
However, the financial cost of such a program may be quite high while the
main beneficiaries,  duck hunters, would only pay a small part of the cost.
In contrast, the transactions cost would probably be  low relative  to a
strengthened Swampbuster provision in the next farm bill.
21Administrative  Pricing
There are also opportunities  in government  to improve water use and
conservation through improved administrative pricing.  This  is
particularly true  for municipal water supplies  or waste disposal  services,
where there  is  a good opportunity for pricing by volume used.  In many
Minnesota cities,  each house has its  own water meter.  For many Minnesota
cities the problem is  not lack of meters, but the lack of imagination by
municipal leaders and those managing the  facilities.  To illustrate,  only
24 percent of the Minnesota cities used a flat rate  (same charge no matter
how much water used) for water services, while 46 percent charged flat
rates  for sewer services  (Easter et  al.,  1988).  This suggests  that 22
percent of the cities which have water meters  are not using them in
charging for sewer services.
Many times  the water price or  charge is  set so  that  the cost of
operation and maintenance are covered by revenues, but this usually does
not include a replacement charge for  facilities.  Water pricing is  seldom
used to encourage conservation or to reallocate  time of use  to non-peak
periods.  At best, you find a constant water rate where the  same price  is
charged for each unit of water used.  At worst, you find a fixed charge
for water, no matter how much is  consumed, or a declining rate where a
lower price  is  charged for each additional unit of water  (i.e.,  1000
gal.).  Although the number of Minnesota cities using the declining block
rate has decreased significantly,  it was  still used by 32 percent of the
cities  in 1985-86.  Less than one percent of Minnesota municipalities use
an increasing block rate, where the price per unit goes up for each
additional unit of water purchased during a given time period (Easter, et
22al.,  1988).  They also do not use higher prices during peak periods to
discourage water use in the summer months or other peak periods.
Part of the problem is  lack of information.  We do not know how people
will react to higher water prices.  For some uses, we would expect that
the price elasticity would be quite  low, while  for others  it may be
fairly high.  If we are dealing with domestic uses that are price
inelastic,  then water prices will have limited impact on use and will not
be a good means  to encourage conservation.  In such cases of inelastic
demand, water charges should be used mostly as  a means to  generate
revenue.  However, during the summer period, consumers appear to  be fairly
responsive to calls  to conserve water, which suggests an elastic demand.
Thus, high prices during such peak periods should encourage water
conservation.
Another reason why water or  sewer charges are not used to encourage
conservation is  political.  Many local users consider water and sewer
charges as just another tax instead of a price for a good or service.
They complain about increasing water charges even when they are provided
better service.  Many city administrators are also afraid that high water
and sewer rates may discourage industrial development.  Yet  it does not
appear that the  level of water and sewer rates  is  an important location
criteria for most industries.
As more and more cities are faced with water shortages and increasing
costs of new water supplies,  these administrators will have to consider
water charges as  a means to  improve water allocation and encourage
conservation.  Municipal water supplies have many of the characteristics
of private goods,  i.e.,  in consumptive uses,  it  is  an exclusive and rival
23good (Randall, 1987).  People can be excluded from hooking up  to municipal
water supplies and consumption by one group usually reduces  the quantity
available for others.
Information and education
One important  role of the U.S. government has been to provide  technical
information concerning water quality and quantity.  This has been on
important factor  in reducing the cost of many water transactions.
Without such technical information  it  is  difficult to establish water
rights  or charge polluters for  the damages they cause.
In our study of nitrate pollution in southeastern Minnesota the lack
of information appears  to be a key reason for excessive applications of
nitrogen fertilizers.  Livestock farmers are underestimating the nutrient
value of their manure  and, consequently, are applying as much as  100
pounds more nitrogen then they need.  In contrast, grain farmers are
applying just about the right amount of nitrogen to maximize private
returns.  Thus  a carefully designed extension education program should be
able to substantially reduce the nitrates going into the environment
without reducing private returns or crop production.
Should society decide that nitrogen use which maximizes private returns
is  still too much, then additional policy tools such as  fertilizer  taxes
would have to be used.  Given the  inelastic nature of estimated farmer
responses, fairly high taxes would be required to bring about significant
reductions in nitrogen use.  This suggests  that efforts  to reduce nitrogen
use should be  targeted to environmental  sensitive areas.  Targeting would
raise information requirements and transaction costs.
24Great Lakes Charter
A new institutional arrangement which has been developed to help in
managing Great Lakes water withdrawals is  the  Great Lakes Charter.  In
1985,  the eight Great Lake  States governors and two Premiers agreed in
principle to coordinate water quantity management in  the Great Lakes by
signing the Great Lakes Charter.  By 1990,  five of the state  legislature
and the  two Great Lakes provinces had enacted legislation that gave  the
Charter the force of law.  The Charter requires states or provinces to
give prior notice and consultation to all  affected states and provinces
prior to approving any major new water diversion or consumptive use of
Great Lakes water.  It also involves the development of a common data base
for the  Great Lakes and the creation of a Water Resources Management
Committee  to develop a Great Lakes water management program.
The Charter creates a cooperative forum to regulate  aggregate water
use in the Great Lakes.  The primary instrument that  is being used for
regulation is non-tradeable water permits  (Frerichs and Easter, 1990).
Whether the  Charter will be successful when significant water shortage
occurs is  not clear.  Three states have still not fully adopted the
Charter.  In addition, there  is no clear method for reducing the
withdrawals allowed under the permits during periods of water shortages.
At best the charter is  suited to slowing down the granting of permits  for
large  increases  in water use, either within the basin or through water
transfers  to areas  outside the basin.  However, the concern about water
transfers from the Great Lakes was high enough to over ride  the
transaction cost of working together and developing the Great Lakes
Chapter.  This was made  easier by  the fact that the states and provinces
25had already been working together on similar issues  in the  Great Lakes
basin.
What can be done  to reduce the  transaction costs of getting the
remaining three states  to adopt the  charter is  not clear.  The most
puzzling case is  the state of Michigan which would seem to have a great
deal to gain from adopting the charter.  A significant reduction in lake
levels would have a very negative impact on Michigan's navigation,
hydropower and recreation sectors.
Collective Action by Users
Collective action by local water users  is nothing new.  As Swaminathan
(1986, p. v.)  so aptly states:
People dependent upon renewable natural  resources have evolved
ways of managing them properly.  When they have failed to do  so,  the
people, the  resources, or both have disappeared.  Communities have
developed such institutionalized forms of control as  irrigation
councils in southern Asia, forest-cutting controls  in Nepal,
wildlife utilization taboos and regulations  in the Congo Basin, the
hema system of pasture protection in Arabia, fishermen's  indigenous
associations.in western and southern Asia, and land use management
for conservation in Zimbabwe.
Although excellent examples of collective natural resource management
can be found they are not easily created.  What can be done  to help
reduce  the transaction cost of such collective action and foster effective
decentralized water management?
Collective action and cost-sharing
Many water conflicts can best be resolved within the watershed in
which they occur by first understanding the distributional effects.
People in the upper part of the watershed do not  receive  the downstream
26benefits  from their soil or water conservation efforts  (Easter et  al.,
1986,  Ch. 11).  They, therefore,  do not devote adequate attention to  soil
or water protection activities  in terms of the benefits and costs to
society.  A number of approaches have been tried to overcome this problem,
including subsidies, cost-sharing and land acquisition to  internalize  the
externality.  In Japan, before 1920  "irrigation associations and
municipalities downstream were very active in improving the deteriorated
watersheds at their own expense....  The most common measures  taken by the
water users downstream were the  acquisition of critical watersheds and
profit sharing plantations  on alien lands"  (Kumazaki, 1982,  p. 113).
Later on, municipalities  and power companies shared the costs of upland
plantation projects.  As water use increased, however, higher levels of
government took over more responsibility and "leased the privately owned
watersheds and planted tree(s),  with financial cooperation of the water
users  downstream, who in turn enjoyed a certain share of the revenues  from
the plantations"  (Kumazaki, 1982, p. 116).
Thus collective action and cost-sharing by all beneficiaries  of clean-
up efforts can be an important way of improving water quality and
quantity.  The  level of an area's economic and institutional development
and the degree of pressure on the resource appear to play major roles in
determining the organizational and institutional  forms adopted.  Formal
and informal private and collective actions can be  a primary  impetus for
water quality improvement.  In other cases, government agencies will have
to play a larger role  in protecting water resources, particularly if a
large number.of polluters are involved or the polluters have substantial
economic or political power.
27One of the key components of such collective action is  a good
understanding by downstream water users of the benefits they receive from
conservation activities upstream.  Given this knowledge,  institutional
arrangements need to be  in place  that allow them to assist in conservation
activities.  If they are cost-sharing, they need to have assurances  that
the  funds will be used for  the desired purposes.  When they want to have
more direct control, they need to  have the  option to lease or purchase
easements in the upper watershed.
Cost-sharing by downstream interests would be considered fair by
upstream land owners, since the  downstream users get most of the
benefits.  These activities may even encourage upstream land owners to
engage in more conservation practices because of the principle of
reciprocity (Sugden, 1984).  Since downstream users are  installing and
cost-sharing on conservation practices,  the upstream owners may feel  they
should also contribute.
Assurance and Free Riders
One of  the first steps  in establishing decentralized water management
is  to recognize the  complexity of the  task involved.  Institutional and
organizational changes  are needed at three  different levels:  (1) the
approach must be accepted as  legitimate at  the state and national levels,
(2) government agencies must be willing to establish close working
relationships with water users  and with each other, and (3) the water
users must be willing to  organize to manage  their water resources.
Obstacles are found at all  three  levels.  Vested interested may block
needed legislative action at  the national or state level.  Agencies may
28not be willing to decentralize decision making and share control over
water resources.  Water users may lack the  commitment and willingness to
take over new and sometimes risky responsibilities.  The risk comes from
two  sources.  First,  it comes from the need to resolve actual and
potential conflicts among water users.  Second,  it involves uncertainty
concerning whether or not the  government agency or agencies will,  in fact,
work with local water users and involve them in management decisions.
Agency commitments to  decentralized water management can change as  quickly
as administrative personnel are changed, especially when the appropriate
water rights and incentives have not been established.
If assurance can be provided that the federal and state governments
will indeed implement decentralized water management, conditions  still
have to be right at the  local level.  A key to decentralizing water
management is broad based local participation, both to ensure consensus
among water users and to build important links between the  local community
and government officials.  Constructive participation does not just
happen.  Local communities and their members must receive significant
benefits from participation.  In addition, gains to individuals need to be
consistent with those for the community as a whole, and the problem of
"free riding" must be overcome.
The free rider  is a classic problem where individuals who cannot be
denied access  to a resource or collective good do  not contribute to  its
provision or maintenance  (Olson, 1971).  If enough users are  free riders,
the resource will no longer be  available or its quality will be low or  its
management will have to be subsidized by the  larger tax paying public.
Experiments  and empirical observations, however, have shown that
29people have a higher inclination to cooperate  than indicated by the theory
of the  free rider  (Etzioni,  1988,  Ch. 4).  Some have attributed this
comforting evidence to  shared values and the moral foundations of
society.4 Cultural, ethnic and political factors are  clearly important.
Others,  such as Runge  (1984) and Williamson (1985),  have considered the
role of  institutional design in providing assurance.  Runge found the key
to cooperative behavior among fishermen, was  the development of
institutions providing assurance  that others would also  limit their
fishing effort.
A number of factors seem to make it easier to develop and establish
institutions and organizations that provide  the necessary assurance  for
collective action in water management.  These  include situations where:
(1) communities are relatively small, stable, and homogenous,  (2)
community leadership is  strong and representative,  (3) benefits from
cooperation are high and relatively evenly distributed and (4) the
community has had experience in providing collective goods and has
received benefits  from doing so  (Easter, 1986 and Easter and Palanisami,
1986).
Fairness and Reciprocity
Several authors have  argued that there  are other important factors
"We believe it  is  important to recognize the  forces of ethics,
etiquette, and 'proper, correct, reasonable, moral, etc.'  standards of
conduct in controlling business relationships....People do not always
violate contracts whenever their own costs are  less than their own gains
from violation.  Temptations  of free-riding or stealing are resisted even
when the net gains for free-riding or  stealing are great.  We don't know
enough about how much  'moral' forces operate  to say more than that  they
exist and should not be  ignored in seeking an understanding of
how....economic  institutions....evolve and operate"  (Alchian and Woodward,
1988, p.  77).
30determining whether or not institutional arrangements will result in
effective collective action  (Baumol, 1982, and Sugden, 1984).  The  first
of these factors is  fairness.  According to Baumol  (1982, p. 640),  "A
distribution is  fair if it  involves no envy by any individual of any
other."  An institutional arrangement would be judged to be fairer  if it
reduced envy.  For example, a set of arrangements which fosters collective
action that provides uniform benefits across all users would be
considered fair.
Sugden  (1984) takes  a slightly different approach to explain the
collective or voluntary provision of goods and services.  According to
him, the principle of reciprocity is  critical  in explaining the provision
of collective or public goods.  That is when a collective good is  provide,
"each person tends  to contribute more as  others  contribute more"  (Sugden,
1984, p. 783).  Thus the  factors listed above as providing assurance are
also  likely to enhance reciprocity.  One difference  is  that the
reciprocity principle suggests that those with the strongest preference
for the collective good relative  to  effort will tend to make the largest
contributions.  Richer individuals will, therefore, tend to  contribute
more than poorer ones, because they want to, not simply because of their
greater ability to pay.
While Sugden's allowance  for  income and power differentials make
reciprocity more appealing as  a basis  for collective action in water
management than assurance, it does not fully solve the free rider problem
in the absence of proper assurances  (Sugden, 1984, p.  781).  Nor  does it
adequately address  the problem of rent seeking either  in collective action
or direct government management.
31The Middle Road
As pointed out earlier these  three general  approaches  for solving
water use conflicts  are not mutually exclusive.  A good example  of a
combination of approaches  is  the Tri-County Conservation project  in
central Minnesota.  It  is a special water quality demonstration project in
the Clearwater Watershed District designed to reduce sediment and nutrient
loadings from agricultural lands.  U.S. and Minnesota state agencies have
formed a partnership with local land owners and the Minnesota Extension
Service  to design and implement the project.  A wide  range of funds are
being used to support  the effort ranging from federal and state funds  to
private foundation grants.
Although the demonstration project  is  relatively new the Watershed
district was  established in  1975 and has  implemented other conservation
programs.  Thus  the transaction cost of establishing  the conservation
demonstration project were  significantly reduced.  There was an ongoing
local organization that did not have to be created.  This would not have
been possible without the  federal legislation that promoted the
establishment of watershed districts.
It  is  too early  to judge how effective  the demonstration project will
be.  Yet it  is  encouraging to  see such an effort  that includes elements of
both research and education.  They want to  reduce water pollution but they
are willing to  experiment to determine which farming practices are
actually most effective  in achieving this.
32CONCLUSION
Institutional and organizational  arrangements are important in
developing strategies  to resolve water conflicts.  Government, market and
collective approaches  each have  their strengths and weaknesses.  The
trend is  toward greater user involvement, increased use of markets and
making government agencies more responsive to users, either through
changing the way they do business or through "privatization" of their
functions.
Two factors are likely to  lead to  increases in the number and type of
conflicts involving water:  (1) the growing complexity of the structure of
water demands, which has grown to include recreation and tourism and
certain "rights of nature";  and (2) the profusion of environmental
hazards, many of which are caused by technical  change, improvements in
living standards and economic growth, and most of which are  dimly
understood and inadequately measured.  Thus  resilience is  likely to be  the
most important characteristic determining the  effectiveness of
institutional and organizational  arrangements in the  coming years.  This
includes the ability of organizations themselves  to adapt to new
circumstances.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The  present  work  is  dedicated  to  the  regulation  of  non-point
pollution  sources)  (NPS),  which  during  the  last  two  decades  have
increasingly  attracted  the  attention  of  water  resources  management
specialists,  policy-makers  and  economists'2
Al-thuogh  many  of  the  observations  contained  in  the  following
pages  can  be  extended  to  other  pollution  sources,  they  are
inspired  above  all  by  studies  conducted  in  recent  years  on
pollutant  loads  from  cultivated  land.  The  interest  concerning  the
regulation  of  these  emissions  derives,  first  and  foremost,  from
the  fact  that  among  NPS  the  removal  of  pollutants  from  cultivated
soils  are  often  reported  as  the  principal  problem  area  as  regards
the  protection  of  water  resources.  Furthermore,  among  the  NPS,
releases  from  agricultural  areas  are  those  for  which  the  need  to
adopt  preventive  measures  is  probably  most  obvious;  the  high
degree  of  spreading  and  diffusion  of  (potentially)  polluting
1agricultural  productive  activities  on  the  territory  notably
reduces,  in  fact,  the  possibility  of  relying  on  "end-of-pipe
Vcontrol techniques".
The  intrinsic nature  of  NPS  raises  the  probability  that
policy-makers  will  face  information  asymmetry  problems  when
setting regulatory schemes. Contrary to  what  is  sometimes, more or
less  implicitly, advocated, we  argue  that  in many  instances  such
problems  do  not  arise  because  the  polluter  holds  "private
information"  about  the  extent  of  pollutant  releases.  Rather,
because he  holds private  information  about  several parameters with
whose knowledge  it  is  necessary  "to  feed"  the predictive models  on
which policy-makers  have necessarily to  rely to overcome  the  non
(direct) monitorability of  pollutant  loads.  These  "parameters"
tipically  include production  patterns,  input  levels,  and/or  the
environmental  characteristics  of  the  site  where  production
activities take place
The idea which has guided our work  is  that explicitly setting
the problem of  NPS regulation  facing  an  hypothetical  agency  in
terms  of a "Principal-Agent relationship"  is  likely to  allow us  to
get  insights  into  three  topics  relevant  to  policy-making:
(i) Which are the  implications  of  information asymmetries  on  the
possibility of  attaining first-best NPS  regulation?;  (ii)  How  can
the problems created by asymmetries  be dealt  with;  (iii)  Is  it
possible to  identify upper  limits  for  the  amount  of  resources
worth investing  in  collecting  information  which  allows  for  the
disappereance of  asymmetries?.
The aim  of  this  contribution  is  not  to  provide  exhaustive
answers  to  these questions but more modestly to  suggest  a  back-
2of-envelope stilyzed model  in  which  these  questions  could  be
accomodated  and,  hopefully, answered.
The paper is  structured  as  follows.  In  the next  Section  the
main distinguishing features  of NPS are  summarized.  In  Section  3
and 4  two  "scenarios"  are discussed:  The  first  is  built  around  the
assumption that  the policy-maker  (hereafter "the  agency"  or  "the
Principal")  knows  the environmental  characteristics  of  the  site
where production decisions take place, but  that  these  decisions
are nor "monitorable";  whilst  in  the  second  scenario  it  is  assumed
that  the  (suspected)  polluter  (hereafter  "the  firm"  or  "the
Agent")  has  some  private  information  about  the  site's
environmental  characteristics.
2.  SOME  CONSIDERATIONS  ON  THE  NATURE  OF  NON-POINT  SOURCE
POLLUTION  CONTROL  PROBLEMS
The  attention  given  to  NPS  represents  a  relatively  recent
situation  . As  far as  we  know, the U.S. Congress  Federal Water Act
of  1972 represents  the  first  official  document  in  which  the
control  of  the NPS was  indicated  as  a  necessary  condition  to
garantuee  the the reaching of acceptable water quality  standards.
On  the other site  of  the Atlantic, even  this  slight  raising  of
consciousness  has been  even slower.
When  trying to provide a characterization  of  NPS with respect
to pollution point sources, the  specialist  literature  has  from
time  to  time undelined  4:  The difficulty of monitoring  pollutant
loads  at  source;  the  role plaied by pedo-climatic parameters  with
3respect  to these  loads;  the difficulty  -owning  to  the  mode  of
conveyance of pollutant  flows- of estimating  "delivery  ratios"  ;
the  fact that pollutant  loads  originates over  a broad  area.
As fas  as  the  "non-monitorability  of  releases  at  source"
attribute  is  concerned,  two considerations are  in  order.
The first  relates  to  the  source  of  non-monitorability.  The
difficulty (or  impossibility) of monitoring may arise not  (simply)
because  there are  "too  many" sources which cannot be  assessed  at
reasonable costs,  but because  the mode  of  conveyance  of  pollutant
loads  is  such that  emissions  are  not  "visible".  This  lack  of
"visibility" may affect the  agency as  well  as  the discharger.
The second point  has  to do  with the  alternatives  to  direct
monitoring open to  the  agency. The difficulty of  direct monitoring
oppurtunity provides,  and  in  fact  provided,  scientists  with  a
stimulus  for  the development of  mathematical models  allowing  for
substituting  direct  monitoring  with  prediction  of  pollutant
loads
Once these models are  made  available  -and  appropriately
tested when  "exported"  to  geographical  contexts  different  from
those where  they were initially  developed-  the  real  question
becomes wheter or  not to use  them for policy-decisions.  Here,  we
are neither advocating  that  predictive  information  the  models
provide should be  interpreted as a perfect  substitute  of  direct
monitoring,  nor  that  the  acceptance  of  whatever  simulation
procedures  is  justified  simply  on  the  ground  that  direct
monitoring  is  impossible.  What  we  advocate  is  that  the
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impossibility of direct  monitoring,  at  least  from  a  strictly
technical point of view, the  possibility  of  adopting  decisions
4once  a  predictive  model  has  received  "political  legitimacy".
Whether or  not a simulation procedure will  receive  such legitimacy
will  depend, among other  things, upon  the willingness and  ability
to  convince people that  a regulatory framework may  eventually  be
designed  using figures obtained  from a computer  rather than  from  a
laboratory  !
To  summarize,  firstly  the  "areal-extent"  attribute  is
certainly important, but  is  not  sufficient  to  characterize  the
regulatory problems  facing  the  agency  in  that  it  cannot  be
regarded  as  the  only  reason  which  prevent  pollutant  release
assessment.  Secondly,  such  non-monitorability  should  not  be
regarded as  an  impedement  to  select  a  regulatory  framework,
provided available predictive models are  granted  with  political
legitimagy.
If  we  assume that such legitimacy has been granted,  and  if we
focus  attention on  (the  subset of)  NPS  in  which the firms  do  not
possess private information  about  pollutant  loads,  is  it  the
regulatory policy devoited of  information asymmetry problems?
The answer  (likely to  be negative) depends on whether or  not
the  (suspected) polluters holdyVbout certain parameters with whose
knowledge  it  is  necessary to  feed predictive models on  which  the
agency rely to overcome the non-monitorability issue.
To  clarify  the  the  latter  statement  let  us  start  by
considering  a  representative  firm  which  uses  a  (potentially
polluting)  input, x, and operates  in  a  site  whose  environmental
characteristics are concisely described by the  variables e  and  y;
e  is  taken as describing characteristics such  as  water  retention
capacity,  texture, slope, etc.,while  the  (stochastic)  variable  y
5describes climatic and pluviometric features.
The  firm's  productive  as  well  pollutant  release
"performances" are affected  by e  and y. In  particular, their  role
with respect  to  the  former are  described  through  the  following
profit function:
" =  "  (  x,  e,  r  )
whilst pollutant releases  associated with x use  are  described  by
the following mathematical  model  (7:
R = I  ( x, e, y  )
In  addition,  let us  assume  that available to  the  agency is  a model
which associates observed  values of ambient pollutant  levels,  p,
to discharges  (R)  (8:
P =  ( R,  )
where X stems  from the uncertainty over the  relationship between p
and  R.  Finally,  the  "social  costs"  associated  with  p  are
calculated according to  the damage  function  D(p).
Notice that while I(.)  provides  a direct  estimate of  R,  once
the productive decisions and  pedo-climatic  characteristics  have
been  taken  into  account,  8(.)  allow us  to  infer  with a degree  of
uncertainty described by X, the value of  R  which  most  probably
contributed to  the observed value of p.
Now based  on  the above  relationships,  a  great  variety  of
information  asymmetry  "scenarios"  can  be  constructed.  In
particular,  if we assume  that the firm and  the  agency  share  the
same  information about y, we can  ignore  this variable,  and  notice
the  following:
6(i) If e  is  monitorable but x is  not,  the  agency  would  face  an
information asymmetry problem  (referred  in incentive  literature as
a "moral  hazard with  hidden action" problem) unless the agency can
observe  the  firm's production outcome;
(ii)  If x is  monitorable but e  is  not,  the agency  would  face  an
information  asymmetry  problem  (namely  an  "adverse  selection"
problem) unless the  agency  can  observe  the  firm's  production
outcome;
(iii)  Whether  or  not  the  agency can  observe  the  firm's  production
outcome,  it  will  face an  information asymmetry problem  if  both  x
and e  are not monitorable;
(iv)  Even  if  we drop X  from  I(.),  in  other  words,  even  if  we
assume  that the  estimation  of  the delivery  ratio  is  not surrounded
by uncertainty, non-monitorability of  both  x  and  e  carries  an
information asymmetry problem, unless the  firm production  outcome
is  known by  the agency.
In  the following pages we will discuss  the  implications  of
information  asymmetries,  rising  from  (i)  and  (iv),  for  NPS
regulation.  In  the next  Section we deal with the moral hazard  with
hidden  actions  type  of  asymmetry,  whilst  in  Section  4  with
adverse-selection
73.  IMPERFECTLY  OBSERVABLE  INPUT USE  (MORAL  HAZARD  WITH  HIDDEN
ACTIONS)
The formal model
We begin by setting out  the  moral  hazard  problem  in  a
Principal-Agent model which will be used  throughout  the  rest  of
this section. As pointed  out  in  the previous  section  the  source of
the moral hazard follows  from asymmetry of  information between  the
two parties that  occurs because the firm's  input  use  cannot  be
monitored.
The  main  purpose  of  Principal-Agent  framework  is  to
characterize  the optimal  form of  an  incentive  scheme  that  the
Principal provides  the  Agent,  thus  indicating  the  charge  (or
subsidy) associated with different ambient pollutant  level.
We  assume  that  the  firm  (the  Agent),  has  a  Von
Neumann-Morgestern  utility function  W (n(x,g),  T),  i.e.  it  is
neutral with regard to  its  own profit n and,  on  the contrary, risk
averse with regard to  tax T. We  also  assume  separability  of  the
utility function on  n  and T. Therefore:
(1)  W"=  n(x,e)  - v(T)
where  n  >  0, n  c 0 and  v'(T)  > 0, v  (T) > 0  (so  the  Agent
can only be risk neutral with regard  to  T:  v  =  0, or  risk averse:
v''>  0).  As  is  common  in  incentive  literature, the assumption  that
T yields disutility to  A  is  adopted  because  T  represents  an
expenditure  incurred by A in  acting on  behalf  of  the  agency.
The agency  (the  Principal)  has  a  Von  Neumann-Morgestern
utility function  WP which  is  formed  by  two  parts:  the  first
consists of  A's utility  function W a, and  the second  is  a  convex
8environmental damage function  D(p),  where  p  is  the  ambient
pollutant  level measured by  the  agency in  the  water body, plus  an
utility  function  over  the  tax,  u(T),  carrying  the  usual
properties:  u'(T)  >  0 ,  u''(T)  0. In  turn p  =  f(R,X),  where  R is
the  pollutant release  at  field  level  and X  is  a  random  variable
on  [x  ,%]  representing the agency's  imperfect  knowledge about  the
delivery ratio,  with  density  function  g(k).  R =F(x,e)  is  a
general form for  the  agency's pollutant  release  (at  field  level)
model defined as  a function  of  the  input  level  x and  a specialized
knowledge  of  the quality of  the  farm 9.  Incorporating these  latter
functions into  the damage function we get:
(2)  WP=  n(x,e) - v(T) - D(p(xX,e)) +  u(T)
It  follows  that even  the Principal  can  only be  risk  neutral:
v'= u'= 0 or risk averse:  v'> 0  and  u'< O.  We  also  assume
u'v - uv' > 0, which ensures  that  for P the disutility  associated
with tax collection  increases less  than  the tax revenue utility.
Note  that  the  agency is  not  indifferent  to A's  choice  of  x as
such, and  cares  about the A's utility as much  as  the  "society's
utility".  The Principal observes  only the ambient pollution  level,
p, and charges  the Agent according to  a tax  schedule  that  is  a
function of  the  only observable variable:  T(p).
Thus the P's objective function  can be expressed as  follows:
(3)  Ek[n(x) - D(p(x,]))  - v(T(p(x.,))]  + u T(p(x,))]]
where the expectation  is  taken with respect  to  the random variable
9K. Analogously, the firm's objective function becomes:
(4)  E,[  (x)  - v[T(p(x,))) ]
It  is  also  assumed  that both parties  agree on  the probability
distribution of  K,  the  pollution  function  p(x,X),  the  utility
functions and  the  firm's profit  function.  We  have  dropped  e  from
the  argument of  the  objective  functions since we  assume  that  it
is  known  to  both parties.
Given  A's  choice  of  x, which is  made before  the  state  of
the  world X is  known,  the value of  the pollution  level p will vary
with X.  We assume  that p(x,k)  is  continuously  differentiable  to
any order, with p. > 0, Pxx '  0,  and  for  convenience  pA  > 0  so
higher values of  X represent to  some extent  "more pollution":  i.e.
less  favorable states.
We also  think of  px  as  the marginal  (pollution)  product  of
input x,  and  we  are  assuming  this  is  always  positive  and
increasing. Combining  the  pollution  function  with  the  damage
function,  even the marginal  (pollution)  damage  of  input  x  is
positive and  increasing (Dpp  > 0, Dpp(px)2+  DpPx  0).
In  the  traditional  Principal-Agent  frameworks  a  Pareto
optimal  tax schedule T(p)  is  generated by  the  following program:
10(5)  max  E,  [  n(x) - D( p(x,)] - v  (T(p(x,X))] + u(T(p(x,))] 
T(p),x
subject to
(6)  max  E[  n(x) - v[ T(p(x,X)))]  Wo
(7)  x e argmax Ea  [  n(x  )  - v[T(p(x  ,X))]  ]
x-e X  L  l J
where  the notation "argmax" denotes  the  set  of  arguments  that
maximize the  firm objective function.
The  constraint  (6),  named  "participation  constraint",
guarantees  the Agent a minimum expected utility  level,  referred to
as  his "reservation utility".  In  the neutral case  (v''=O) and with
marginal tax disutility  equal  to  one,  A's  objective  function
consists of  his  after tax profit,  and Wo  could be  interpreted  as  a
positive profit  that  should cover  at  least  fixed production  costs.
Constraint  (7),  on  the  other hand,  reflects  the fact  that  the
Principal can  observe the pollution  level  p  but  not  input  x.
Therefore  if  the  agency wants to  induce the firm to  choose a given
level  of x he must design an  "incentive compatible"  tax schedule.
If  we  had  assumed  that P could observe x, a forcing  contract
could  have been adopted  to guarantee  that  the  Agent  selects  a
proper action  even when T(p)  is  chosen  to  solve  (5)  and  (6)
ignoring  (7).  This  contract  is  referred  to  as  the  first-best
solution, which entails optimal  risk sharing  (the agency  provides
the firm with  a  schedule  showing  the  charge  associated  with
different pollution  levels, taking into  account  the optimal  input
use).
11This  first-best  risk  sharing  contract  is  in  general  different
from  the  solution  drawn  from  (5)  subject  to  (6)  and  (7)  referred
to  as  the  second-best  solution.
Full  information  (first-best  solution)
With  x  observable,  a  first-best  Pareto  optimum  with  regard  to
both  risk  sharing  and  A's  choice  of  x  is  attainable  '.  The
Principal  solves  the  following  problem:
(8)  max  E,[  n(x)  - D  P(x,)) - v  (T(p)]  +  uT(p)]  T(p),x
s.t.
EA[  n(x)  - v(  T(p))]  W
Note  that  since  x  is  to  be  chosen  before  the  uncertainty
about  the  exact  relation  between  runoff  and  pollution  level  is
solved,  it  will  not  depend  on  X. A first-best  Pareto  optimum  will
then  be  an  optimal  action  x  for  A  and  an  associated  optimal  tax
Schedule  T  (p).  The  contract  between  P  and  A  would  then  specify
this  schedule  in  exchange  for  A  choosing  x.
Applying  standard  Lagrangean  techniques,  we  obtain  the
following  familiar  conditions  as  the  solution  to  the  maximization
problem:
(9)  (i+p)nx  =  EA[  DP  p  ]
(10)  (i+p)v'(T(p))  =  u'(T(p))
(11)  i >  0  H[  E[  n(x)  - v(T(p))  - Wa]]  =  0
Given  v'  >  0  and  u'  >  0,  the  Lagrangian  multiplier  P
12associated with the participation  constraint  is positive  and  the
Agent  receives  only his  reservation utility Wo  .
The second  order condition  for a maximum are  always satisfied
under  our assumptions about  the utility functions.
The  first condition relates  to  the  optimal  choice  of  x  and
has  a straightforward  interpretation  in  terms  of  marginal  profit
of  x equal to  the  expected value of  the marginal  damage associated
with the pollution  level  attributable  to x. We  can also  think  of
n  as  the  number of  A's utility that A  receives  to  be  paid  to
supply the marginal bit  of x in  term  of  P's utility.
At  the  optimum the  tax schedule  is  given  by  condition  (10)
(10)
which, under the  separability assumption,  is  constant over  p
However the  ratio  u'/v' is decreasing  in  T  and  represents  the
number  of P's utility  to be given  up  to  yield  one more unit  of A's
utility.
Asymmetric Information (second-best  solution)
Now  let us  return  to  our  problem  that  the  Principal
observes  only the pollution  level p.  Consequently  the  incentive
scheme will be  contingent  on  a lesser  set  of  variables  and  the
Principal  has  less  control  over  the  optimal  input  choice,
therefore he  can expect,  at  most,  his  expected  full  information
pollution  level.
A formal approach to  this  problem  would  be  to  take  the
problem of  first-best  (full  information) and append  to  it  the  A's
first  order  condition as  a constraint. This approach implies  that
P's choice  of  T(p) will now take account  of  his  effect  on  A's
choice  of x via A's maximization  condition.  It  turns out,  however,
13that  this problem is  not "well behaved";  if  T(p)  is  not  restricted
to  some  finite  interval at  each p, an  optimal  solution  may  well
not exist,  as shown by Mirrlees  (1975).  If  T(p)  is  restricted  to  a
finite  interval,  as  seems quite reasonable,  the  derivative  T'(p)
which appears  in  A's  first order condition may not  exist  at  all
points.
An  alternative approach,  suggested  by  Mirrlees  (1974,1975)
and developed by Holmstr6m (1979)  and  Shavell  (1979)  gets  around
this difficulty by eliminating X from the problem and  regarding  p
itself  as the relevant  random  variable  with  respect  to  which
expected  values are taken.  In  other words given an  input  level  x
there  is  a pollution  level  for each value of  X  with  probability
density g(X),  so  that  the  function  p(x,X)  and  g(X)  jointly
determine a probability distribution  for p.
This  approach  goes  under  the  name  of  "  parameterized
distribution formulation  of uncertainty",  according to  which  the
cumulative distribution  of  p given x is described by a  cumulative
distribution function F(p;x)  on  [p  ,p],  with  density  f(p;x)  > 0.
This function  is  assumed  to  be differentiable in x.
It  easy to show that  if  pX  > 0  then  F,(p;x)  < 0,  in  other
words,  the fact  that  a  higher  input  level  implies  a  higher
pollution  level  is  formalized  by  the  first  order  stochastic
dominance  relation  on  [p  ,p]  that  shifts  the  cumulative
distribution to  the right. A require technical  attribute  is  that
both  the upper bound p = p(x,K)  and  the  lower bound p = p(x,X) are
invariant to changes  in  x.
With this alternative  formulation of uncertainty, for a given
tax schedule T(p),  the A's maximization problem becomes:
14p
(12)  max  J  I(x) - v(T(p))]f(p;x)dp
p P
which,  since  f(p;x)dp  =  0  because  of  unchanged  support  of
p
f(p;x),  yields  the  following  first  order  condition:
(13)  X  - v(T(p))f(p;x)dp  =  0
p
Of  course,  this  condition  is  not  sufficient  for  optimality  of
x.  The  second  order  condition  needs  to  be  satisfied  if  a  maximum
is  to  be  obtained;  taking  the  second  derivative  of  (12)  with
respect  to  x  we  get:
p
(14)  .1xx  J  v(T(p))fp;x)dp  '  0
p
The  incentive  constraint  for  the  Principal-Agent  problem  is
now  given  by  the  first  order  condition  (13)  and  P  has  to  find  a
tax  schedule  T(p)  which  solves  the  following  program:
15(15)  max  [n(x)  - D(p)  - v  T(p)  + uT(p)]f(p;x)dp
T< p)  ,x  J  [  -
s.t.
P
J  [(x)  - v(T(p))]f(p;x)dp >  Wo
P
v(T(p))f(p;x)dp  =  n x
p
where Wo  is  the Agent reservation utility, and  p  is  the  random
variable which plays the same  role as  X  in  the  program  described
by (5)-(6)-(7).
Forming  the  Lagrangian,  with  multipliers  pi  and 
(independent  of  p)  associated  to  the  respective  constraints,  we
get  the  following  conditions:
u'(T(p))  Mx^' 30
(16)  (T(p)) - + 1  +  p v'(T(p))  - 1 +  f(p;x)
P
(17)  nx  - f  [  D(p)  +  v(T(p))  - u(t(p))]f(p;x)dp +
p
+  X"  - J  v(t(p))fx(P;x)d  ] 
p
p
(18)  pS  0  P  [n(x)  - v(T(p))]f(p;x)dp - W  =  0
p
These  first two  equations jointly  with  (13)  represent  the
16solution  to  the Principal-Agent problem. In  particular T(p) and  x
are determined  through equations (16)  and  (13)  respectively and  pz
is  given as  the  solution  to  the  adjoint equation  (17).  Finally the
positivity of pi  follows from the Kuhn-Tucker  condition  (18).
According to  the solution previously  derived  when  assuming
monitorability of  input x, we  know  that T(p)  is  a  Pareto  optimal
tax  schedule, from a risk sharing point of  view,  if  the r.h.s.  of
(16)  is  constant.  Since p.  is  constant  and positive,  the  r.h.s.
of  (16)  is  constant  if  the  term  2 f  - does not  change  over  p.
In  turn,  M2  f  I  is  constant  if  f  = 0 ,  which,  however,  would
contradict the previous assumption that  Fx < 0  at  least  for  some
p. Consequently perfect  risk sharing  results only when p2= 0.
However,  from our assumptions about  the  P  and  A's  utility
functions and  about the  cumulative distribution  function  F(p;x),
the following proposition can be proved:
Proposition  If:  If  n  > 0 and F  x  0, then P 2 <  0.
Proof:  see appendix A.1.
From the  proposition  the  incentive  constraint  is  always
binding  and according to  (16)  the second-best optimal  tax schedule
shows  that the risk sharing  will  be  no  more  Pareto  efficient
compared with condition  (10)  described  in  the  full  information
case. The need to take  account  of  the  incentive  effect  on  A
carries with  it a distortion with respect  the first-best solution.
The direction  of this  distortion will depend  in  general  on
how f  and  f vary  with  p,  which,  in  turn,  depends  on  the
x
underlying functions g(X)  and p(x,\).
17Differentiating  through  (16)  gives:
(18)  dp  dp 
dT so,  for  P  < 0,  (18)  does  not  imply  dT  =0  as  in  full
information,  unless  restrictions  are  placed  on  F(p;x).
The  term  f  /f  is  usually  referred  to  as  the  likelihood  ratio
and,  as  was  pointed  out  by  Holmstrom  (1979),  it  measures  how
strongly  the  Principal  is  inclined  to  infer  from  the  pollution
level  p  that  the  Agent  did  not  take  the  assumed  action.  It  can  be
interpreted  as  a  benefit-cost  ratio  of  deviating  from  optimal
first-best  risk  sharing,  and  (16)  gives  the  penalties  (or  bonuses)
that  the  Agent  should  pay  in  proportion  to  this  measure.  In  fact
from  the  above  proposition  we  may  derive  the  following
relationship  between  the  second-best  tax  schedule  T *(p)  and  the
first-best  solution  T  (see  appendix  A.1):
T  (p)  > T  if  p  P  P  {  p /  (p;x)  0 
(19)  * 
T  (p) <  T*  if p  P  ,  P-  =  ,  p  /  f(p;x)  <  0  }
Note  also  that  if  we  assume  that  higher  level  of  ambient
pollution  are  indeed  a  correct  sign  of  higher  use  of  polluting
input  ("monotonic  likelihood  ratio  property"),  the  Principal
provides  the  Agent  with  a  tax  schedule  that  increases  with  the
(12)  dT
observed  pollution  level  p  <  :  d  )  0.  It  can  also  be  shown
(see  appendix  A.2)  that  this  property  also  plays  a  part  in
guaranteeing  the  uniqueness  of  a  second-best  optimal  tax  schedule.
18Finally,  since  p 2 <  0 and  since the  likelihood ratio  is  not
constant, the proposition  implies that  the  second-best  solution
is  always  strictly'  worse for both  P  and  A  than  the  solution
derived under  full  information,  with the  Agent  forced  to  carry
more  responsibility for  the pollution  observed  in  the environment.
Note,  however,  that  even  if  A benefitted from a move  to  the
first-best, providing P with the  information on  his  choice  of  x,
we would face  a problem  of  incentive compatibility;  that  is,  if
the contract  is  written conditionally on  A's  information of  x,  A
has  an  incentive  to  lie  to  his  own advantage.
The neutral actors  case
Up  to  now we  assumed  that both actors  are  not  risk  neutral
with regard to  the tax schedule.  This was  reflected  by  v'  >  0,
u'  <  0. In  this section we  allow  for  neutrality  of  both  the
Principal  and  the  Agent,  which,  in  turn,  will  give  us  the
opportunity  to  show  that  a  first-best  optimal  risk  sharing
solution  can  be  achieved even under  asymmetric  information.  Yet
this will  allow us  to accommodate  in  our  framework  some  results
contained  in a recent contribution by Segerson  (1988).
For simplicity we  assume  v(t)  = T  and  u(t)  = (i+P)T,  with
p > 0. The parameter p has to be  interpreted  as  the  net  "social"
marginal  utility of  raising one  additional unit  of  tax  revenue.
It  follows, from (16),  that:
~~u  I  P~f  (p;x)
(20)  v  = (i  p)  =  1  +  f(p;x)
Since,  in  general,  i  > 0  and  fx/f  is  not  constant,
19condition (20)  cannot be  satisfied unless  the incentive  multiplier
P2  = 0.  It  follows  that  under  the  "neutrality  assumption",
imperfect monitorability of the Agent actions does not prevent the
attainment  of  a first-best  risk sharing solution.  In  fact,  from
the  full  information condition  (10) we  get  p = P, which  in  turn
is  equivalent  to  the  condition we  can draw from  (16).
Moreover, after some  substitutions  (17)  becomes:
P
(21)  (1 +  P)nT  = D(p)f(p;x)dp
p
which  is  equivalent to  (9) in  terms of  the  random variable p.
In  the particular case p  = 0, i.e.  the  tax schedule does  not
affect  the Principal's welfare, we  can  rewrite condition  (20)  as:
f (p;x)
(22)  0  =  +  f(p;x)
It  is  evident,  from  our  previous  discussion,  that  this
condition might  be satisfied  only  if  i  =  0  and/or  P.  = 0,  which
means  that both participation and  incentive  constraints  are  not
binding. In  fact,  from  the  Principal's  point  of  view,  p =  0
implies the  disappearance  of  a  direct  trade-off  between  tax
revenue  and  improvement  of  the  "social  operational  profit"
( n(x) - D(p)  ); in  such a case  the participation  constraint  does
not need  to  be binding and  this,  in  turn,  carries  with  it  the
redundancy of  the  incentive  compatibility constraint  (z  =  0).
Taking a different  perspective,  the  analyst  is  allowed  to not
account  for  the  incentive constraint only  if  the policy maker does
20not  care  about tax  revenue  as  such,p = 0  (p  =  0  implies  the
participation  constraint  is  never  binding,  i = 0).  In  other
words, the  "social"  price paid  by the Principal to  avoid  incentive
compatibility is  to  let  the Agent  above  his  reservation  utility
(obviously this price equals  zero  if  p = 0).
If  our  interpretation  is  correct,  the  results  contained  in
Segerson's  contribution might be  interpreted along  the  lines  of
the  former perspective we  have  just  suggested.
When p = 0 the  first order condition becomes:
P
(23)  nT =  D(p)fx(p;x)dp
p
and  consequently the  optimal  tax schedule  should be  equal  to  the
damage function:  T  (p) =  D(p)  ,  which means that  the  suspected
polluter will be  induced to  choose  the socially  optimal  level  of
input  given by  (23).  Yet,  this  first-best  solution  differ  from
that of  full  information in  as much as  it  implies a  tax  schedule
which  is  no  longer  constant  over  p  and,  at  the  optimum,
Two(p)  <  -[xp=o(  P)]  - W.
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  optimality  of  the  linear
incentive scheme designed by Segerson  over  the  ambient  level  of
pollutants follows the assumptions about D(p)  and  f(p;x):  in  fact
as  argued by Hart-Holmostrom  (1987,p.81)  "...almost  any  shape  of
[T(p)]is  consistent  with  optimality,  because  [ambient  level
pollutants]can  be  endowed  with  rather  arbitrary  information
content".
214.  IMPERFECTLY  OBSERVABLE  FIRM  LOCATION  CHARACTERISTICS  (ADVERSE
SELECTION)
So  far we  have  concentrated  on  asymmetry  of  information
rising from the  inability of  the  agency to monitor  input  use.
However  we  can  conceive  other  instance  of  information
asymmetry  rising  from  the  fact  that  the  firms  hold  private
information  about  (environmental)  characteristics  of  their
location  (as mentioned  in  section  2,  these  characteristics  are
likely to  play  an  important  role  both  with  regard  to  both
productive performances and pollutant  releases).  It  is  reasonable
to  assume that  if  firm "type" were known by  the agency, this would
influence the  choice  of  x he would  like  the firm to  make.
In  this  situation,  what  is  needed  is  a  contract  which
provides the  firm with an  incentive to  pass  a  "message"  to  the
agency about  his  typology.
The  type of  information asymmetry we have  just  depicted  is
referred  to  in  incentive  literature  as  an  adverse  selection
problem. In  the following pages we will  concentrate  on  contracts
allowing the  firm to  pass as  "message"  a value of  e.  That  is,  we
concentrate  on  direct  transmission  mechanisms,  focusing  in
particular  on  incentive schemes which induce  the  firm  to  reveal
the  true value of e  (revelation principle)(13>
In  short  the problem facing the agency can  be  summarized  as
follows:  after  sending  a  message  about  e,  the  firm  will  be
instructed  to  take an  action, x(e)  and  to  pay  a  tax  T(e);  in
instructing  the  firm to  choose x(e)  and  in  defining  T(e),  the
agency  has  to  account for  the  possibility  that  the  firm  might
22report  an  untrue  message  about  the  characteristics  of  its
location.
To simplify  the analysis we  will assume that e  can  take  on
only two values:  e and e  ;  the Principal  assigns probability  a
to  e  =  e  ,  (i-a)  to  e  =  e2  and  these  probabilities  are  common
knowledge.  We  take  e1  <  e2  as  meaning  that  location  e  is
intrinsically more  fragile from  a pollutant  release point  of  view
and,  at  the same  time, more productive;  in  other  words:  ne  >  0,
n x  > 0 and Le >  0, where
L(x,e) = D[p[R(x,e)]  ;  Lx > 0 , L  0
Moreover, we assume,  once more  to  lighten  the  analysis,  that
both parties are  risk neutral with respect  to  tax.
Following what  has  become an  almost  conventional approach  to
the treatment  of  adverse  selection  problem  (see  for  example
Rees  1987),  we  introduce  the  notion  of  "social  operational
profit",  P,  defined  as  nPn(xe)-L(xe)  to  derive  the
following function:
x.  X(  nv  ,  e.)  i  =  1,2  X  >  0
which, when substituted  in  the agent profit  function,  allows  us to
define  his utility function, Wa , in  (nP,T)-space, i.e.  in  the  same
space  in  which the Principal utility function  is  defined;  under
our  assumptions the  latter  takes the following form:
(24)  Wp = [  (x,e) - (x,x,e)  ] + PT  p  +  PT  ,  P >  0
An  optimal  tax schedule can be  derived  from  the  following
program:
23(25)  max  {[n(xnTrP  e.8),ej  - L(x(nPe  ),eJlJ  +  PT]  +
(i-)  [nTrx(Tn  e).,e]  - L[x(T2  e),  J  +  pT]}
s.t.
(26)  n(x(nP,e,),e 1 - T, >  Wo
(27)  n(x(r
p e 2 )  e]  - TT  >  W§
(28)  n[x(Tr,e i),e t - T  >  n(x(rrPe)e-  ]  - T
(29)  T(x(nPe),z]e  - T  >  T(x(7Pe 2)  2 )  - T·
where Wo is  A's reservation utility.  The  inequalities  (26)  and
(27)  represent  the participation constraints  (sometimes  referred
to  in  the  literature dealing with  adverse-selection  problems  as
"individual rationality constraints"), whilst (28)  and  (29)  are
the  incentive  compatibility  constraints  ("self-selection
constraints").
Through  a  diagrammatic  exposition  it  is  possible  to  show  the
main  properties  of  the  optimal  incentive  scheme  derivable  from
solving  program  (25)-(29).
Let  us  begin  with  tracing  the  agent  indifference  curve  (for
given  e  = ei)  when  assuming  the  participation  constraint  is
binding  ,W 0 =  WO.  (see  appendix  A.3):
24T(x) TC
T(x**)  - - -_  - _  --
eP^<x  *)  /  TP(x**)
_  W  /
FIG.1
Notice  that,  given  the  assumption  of  risk  neutrality  to  tax,
values  of  W e >  Wo  are  captured  by  indifference  curves  shifting
with  the  same  slope  in  the  direction  indicated  by  the  arrows  in
fig.1.  (so  that  for  given  nP the  tax  has  to  decrease).
Since  the  Principal's  utility  function  is  linear  with  the
negative  slope  (-'/p),  the  portion  of  the  Agent's  indifference
curve  in  whose  range  the  optimal  combination  of  tax  and  social
operational  profit  must  be  researched  will  be  between
[  n(x:  ),  T  i(x)  3  and  [  (x  ),  T,(x*)  ,  i  =  1,2.
25For  whatever  value  of  p  '  O,  in  order  to  identify  an
equilibrium  it  is  necessary  for,  as  e  varies,  the  indifference
curve  to  shift  as  indicated  in  fig.2;  in  particular  what  is
required  is,  for  the  above  mentioned  interval,  the  upper  curve
(corresponding  to  firm  typology  e z)  be  steeper  than  the  lower  one
(corresponding  to  firm  typology  8,).  As  shown  in  appendix  A.3,
this condition  is  in  fact  "equivalent"  to  the  Spence-Mirrlees





Let  us  briefly  discuss  the  properties  of  the  optimal
incentive  scheme  as  suggested  by  fig.2.
26At  any  level  of nP,  the higher  the tax  revenue the  higher  P's
utility.  In  other words the Principal would certainly  like  to  hold
the  firm  to  its  reservation utility.  This however  is  not  suitable
for  both  firm  typologies,  since  it  is  always  possible,  and
worthwhile,  for  a firm operating  in location  2  to  claim  that  he
operates  on  e  . In  fact,  let  us  suppose  the Principal  offers  the
following contract:
[  (x1)  , T(xl) ]
if  the  agent declares  that  he  belongs to  typology  e,  and  the
contract:
[  P(x: ) ,  T(x)  ]
if  he  declares  he  belongs  to  class  e.  Clearly  the  Agent
effectively  operating on  82  will  always  have  an  interest  in
claiming he  is  operating on ei  in as  far as  the  first  of  the  two
contracts would allow him  to  position  himself  on  a  "superior"
utility curve;  in  fact  the utility  loss deriving  from the  use  of
lower quantities of x  would  be  more  than  compensated  by  the
reduction  in tax payments. The  tax schedule  at  equilibrium  must
therefore necessarily lie  on  an  indifference  curve  (  2)  passing
through  [(xz),T(xz).  In  this way  if  e =  e2  the  firm
will be  indifferent  to  either reporting or  not  its  true  nature,
since
(x,e z ) - T(x,)  = n(x,e)  - T(xA)
and,  according  to  the  revelation  principle  it  will  tell  the
Principal  the truth. On  the  other  hand  if  e  = e  the  firm  will
27obviously report  the truth, since  [P'(x 2),T(x2)] would place  him  on
an  "inferior"  indifference curve.
It  follows  that, at  equilibrium, two  of  the  above constraints
are not binding, namely  (27)  and  (28).  In  other words, the optimal
incentive scheme will allow for discouraging  the firm operating on
the  less  environmental  fragile  location from  hiding itself  in  the
guise of  e8  and,  by contrast,  the more "environmentally fragile"  firm
has no  incentive  to  claim to  be  of typology e2 (i.e.  constraint  (28)  is
not  binding).  But  the  cost  of  extracting  information  is
constituted by  the  fact  that,  if e  =  ez,  the firm will receive  more
than  its  reservation utility  (i.e.  constraint  (27)  is  not binding);  it
will  provide the same  amount of  social  operational profit  but  he
will  face  a  lower  tax  payment  when  compared  with  the  full
information situation.
This  lower payment  can  be  interpreted  as  the  price  the
Principal  should be prepared  to pay to  alleviate  the  information
asymmetry problem;  or,  taking  a  different  perspective,  as  the
amount  of  agency  resources  worth  investing  in  collecting
information directly so as  to  allow  for  the  disappearance  of
information  asymmetry.
A more formal  characterization of  the  incentive scheme can be
provided by starting with  deriving  the  "monotonicity  property"
from  the  incentive  compatibility  conditions.  Roughly,  this
condition  requires a higher value of  T when e  is  higher.
By adding  (28)  and  (29)  we get the following  inequality:
28(30)
|[x(,P, e)  n  - x(,,)  +  [x(  ,ez),ej  -Tn  Tx(<  Ppe  ),e3  2  0
which,  if  a  separating  equilibrium  exists,  is  strictly  positive
(i.e.  the  monotonicity  condition  holds)  since  in  a  discrete
framework  (30)  is  equivalent  to  the  Spence-Mirrlees  sorting
condition  (see  appendix  A.3).
Moreover,  since  at  the  equilibrium  (27)  and  (28)  are  not
binding,  the  incentive  scheme  may  be  deemed  from  the  program
(25)-(26)-(29)  which  provides  the  following  solution:
TI  =  [(x(red),e)  - w
(31)
T,=  TX(f,6),6 2 )  +  [ntx(<P,e'),e  3  - x(<P22e  ,  2]
where  the  term  in  squared  brackets  is  negative  and  less  (in
absolute  value)  than  WO. Therefore  we  can  interpret  the  difference
between  this  term  and  Wo  as  an  "information  premium"
provided  to  the  Agent  if  e  =  e8.
Finally  notice  that:
(32)  T  - T1 n=  x(nzP),)J - n[x(rPe 2 )e)  +  W0  >  0
where  the  positivity  follows  from  the  incentive  compatibility
constraint  (29)  and  the  "monotonicity  condition"  (30):  i.e.  it  is
still  worth  for  the  Principal  to  pay  an  "information  premium",  in
terms  of  a  lower  tax  with  regard  the  full  information  solution,  to
29separate  the  two  firm's  typologies.
30NOTES
(1)  Evaluation  of  alternative  NPS  regulatory  schemes  thruogh
oprational research empirical models  are provided, for  example, by
Taylor  (1975);  Taylor-Frohberg  (1977);  Jacobs-Casler  (1979);
Kramer et  al.  (1984);  Hartley (1988).  Theoretical  insights  about
their  relative properties  are provided are provided,  among others,
by Griffin-Bromley (1982);  Shortle-Dun  (1986);  Segerson  (1988).
For  a review, see Dosi  (1990).
(2) Among NPS we  can  include urban  and  industrial  areas  unserved
by sewage networks, and  agricultural  surfaces. Nutrients,  organic
matter,  heavy metals, pesticides, hydrocarbures,  etc.  may  all  be
included  among  the  pollutants  transferred  from  these  areas.
(Novotny, 1989).
(3) In  the  paper we  concentrate  on  NPS  emissions  raising  from
productive activities  in  a narrow sense.
(4) See for  example Vigon  (1985).
(5) By delivery ratio  it  is  meant  the  ratio  between  pollutant
loads  at  field  level  and the quantities effectively delivered to  a
water body taken as  reference.
(6) For a review of  available NPS  models,  see  Zingales-Giorgini
(1986).
(7) For  example, C.R.E.A.M.S. (Chemical  Runoff  and  Erosion  for
Agricultural  Management Systems;  see  Knisel,  1980)  enters  into
this  family of  models.
(8) For  example, M.R.F.  (Mass response  Function;  Rinaldo-Marani,
1987)  eneters  into  this  family of  models
(9)  We assume  that x (and/or k) can  be  costlessly  observed,  so
that p can be  taken depends only  on  X.
(10)  The result  is  similar  to the one  from the theory  of  optimal
insurance, where for given x  a  risk  neutral  P  should  give  a
constant tax  to  the agent  to  full  insuranced him.
(11)  This proposition constitutes an adaptation to  our  case  of
Holmostrom's proposition  1, pag.78.
(12)  This property seems quite natural even  if  it  is  easy  to
build  examples  of  conditional  distribution  F(p;x)  that  not
satisfied  it  (Grossman-Hart 1983).
(13)  The revelation perinciple follows  from  the  fact  that  if
under some  contract  it  is  omptimal  for  the  agent  to  pass  as
message  an  untrue value of e,  it  is  always possible  to  define  an
alternative contract which induces the  firm to  tell  the  truth  and
which make both parties no worse  off.
31APPENDIX
A.1  - To  prove  the  proposition  we  follow  the  same  approach  as
Holmstrom  (1979,  p.  90).  Let  us  suppose,  contrary  to  our  claim,
that  pz  2  O.  Then:
u'(T(p))  - u'(T  )
(la)  v'(T(p))  = i  +  , + ~2  f  =  (T)
for p e P= {  p/  f  (p;x) >  0  ,  and  where  T*  is  the  first-best
tax  schedule  constant  over  p.  Now  since  the  ratio  u'/v'  is
decreasing  in  T(p),  for  a  fixed  value  of  p,  we  have  from  (la)  that
T(p)  <  T*.  On  the  other  hand  T(p)  >  T  if  p  e  P  ,  where,
obviously,  P  =  P  /  fX(p;x)  <  0  }
Now  if  we  consider  equation  (17)  and  substituting  equation
(13),  we  obtain:
(2a)  J  [-  D(p)  +  av(T(p))  - u(T(p))] f(p;x)dp  +
p
Z[  2  xx  - f  v(T(p))fxp;x)dp  ]  0
P
We  notice  that  since  the  second  expression  in  (2a)  is  the
second  order  maximizing  condition  for  the  Agent,  and  hence
negative,  if  the  first  integral  is  less  than  zero  the  equation
does  not  hold  unless  P2  <  0.  In  fact  we  can  show  that  this  is  the
case:
32(3a)  f  [  D(p)  +  zv(T(p))  - u(T(p))] x(p;x)dp 
p
I  [-  D(p)  + 2v(T")  - u(T)]if(p;x)dp < 0
p
where  the  last  inequality follows from the  assumption  F  0  and
X
the  fact that T  is  constant, while the first  inequality  derives
from the  assumption v'u  - vu'  > 0, implying that  the  ratio v/u  is
increasing with T.
Combining (2a)  and  (3a) we  get p2  < 0, which  contradicts  our
first claim. We  have  arrived  at  a  contradiction  assuming  P 2> 0
and  conclude  that p2 < 0. Q.E.D.
A.2  - To guarantee  that the  optimal solution  for  the  P.-A.
problem exists we have  assumed the  second order  condition for  the
Agent's problem is  satisfied, something which may not be  true  in
all cases. Moreover  the uniqueness  of  the solution, which  implies
that the A's utility function  is strictly concave  in  x for  all  x
and  under the optimal  tax schedule T(p),  is  hard  to  establish.
Integrating by part the A's objective function  we get:
(4a)  f  [  (x)  v(T(p)) ]f(p:x)dp =
P
P
=  n(x) + J  v'(T(p))T'(p)F(p;x)dp - v(T(p))
where v(T(p))  is  independent  of x as  F(e;x) = 0 and F(p;x) = 1 for
all x. Since n(x)  is assumed  to  be  concave  and  v'(T)  > 0,  the
objective function  is  concave  in x if  T'(p) 2 0 and Fx(p;x) S 0.
33As  was  shown  by  Mirrlees  (1975),  Grossman-Hart  (1983)  and
Rogerson  (1985)  these  two  conditions  are  sufficient  to  guarantee
the  uniqueness  of  the  solution  and  therefore  for  equation  (16)  to
describe  the  optimal  inventive  scheme.
If  we  introduce  the  "monotonic  likelihood  ratio  property",
from  (18),  we  get  T'(p)  2 0.
As  far  as  the  second  condition  is  concerned,  what  we  need  is
that  for  all  xl  and  xz ,  p  and  a  - (0,1):
F(p;  oxi+  (i-a)x2 )  o  aF(p;x i )  +  (i-a)F(p;x 2)
so  that  the  input  level  ox +(i-a)xz is  stochastically  inferior  to
x  with  probability  a  and  x2 with  probability  (i-a).  In  other
words,  in  designing  his  plan  to  maximize  his  expected  operational
profit,  the  Agent  always  has  an  action  available  (in  terms  of  x
choice)  yielding  a  distribution  stochastically  inferior  with
regard  to  the  distribution  he  would  obtain  by  randomizing  between
x.  and  x2.
A.3 - In  this  appendix  it  is  shown  how  A's  indifference  curve
may  be  traced  within  (nP,T)-space,  where  it  is  recalled
nP =  n(.)  - L(.).
Let  us  start  by  decribing  the  main  properties  of  n(.):
(>  0  x  <  x:
(5a)  n=  =  0  x  =  x.  nXX <  0
<<0  x>x
r  >  °  ,  > Xe  >0  ,  n(o,e)  =  (x,e) =  0
where  x  is  the  optimal  private  input  level  (without  regulation).
34The  damage  function  L(.).  has  the  following  properties:
(6a)  L  >  ,  L  0  ,  L  0  <  0  ,  LX  < 
Combining  (5a)  and  (6a)  we  get:
0*
p  >  0  X  <  Xm*
(7a)  {  =  0  x  =  x**  n  X  <  0
<  0  X  >  X
7  >  0°  ,  e  >)  '  nP(  0  e)  =  P(Xe)  =  o
where  x  is  the  input  level  which  would  maximize  1p.  Obviously,
x  <  x  and  x  x.
35n,L
rrr(x)
*(  - - x
xi  X2 Xi X2
p  **  I
p (X*  )  2
-----  *  \  - \  x
2
I  I
X'  X2  X-  X2
From  rP(.)  we  can  derive  :
(8a)  x  =  x(  nr,  e  )
owining  the  following  properties:
36**
x  >  o  x  <  x
(9a)  <  I  for x P  x




Substituting  (8a)  in  n(.)  we  get:
(10a)  W  =  n(x,e)  - T  -n T(n.Pe),  e)  - T
Now  for  given  e  let  us  consider  the  properties  of  A's
indifference  curve  (when  Wa =  WO  )  within  (n,T)-space.
1dT  X  >  1  °m  x  <  x m
drp  nt  -L=
(Hla)  --  =  „x  {  ^  =  <  °  x  <  ~  <  x
dn'  x  x  >  0  x  >x
(l1a)  tells  us  that  the  indifference  curve  increases  with  a
positive  slope  until  the  point  where  the  social  operational  profit
is  maximum  (  nP(x  ),  T(x  )  ),  and  increases  with  a  negative
slope  between  ( n(x**),  T(x  )  )  and  (  n(x*),  T(x)  ),  with
nP(x  )  - nP(x  )  and  T(x  )  S  T(x*);  furthermore  it  decreases
with  positive  slope  wherevern  (x) <  nP(x  ).
Taking  the  second  derivative  we  get:
(12a)  d 2 T  = n  (=  9 + x
dZ~7~,----TT 2'  L-  '  x -=  n/
xx  x  O(np)z (7x  Lx)  2  I  LX (x  xx
(~X  -LYXZ  ~  "
From  (12a) andfrom the concavity of  the  social  operational
37profit  function  we  get:
2  f  >  °  °<,S  x  <  x0
(13a)  d  -=  <  O  x  <  x
d(nP  {  ?  x  >  x
Moreover,  given  the  regularity  of  n(.)  and  L(.),  the
following  limits  hold:
lin  [  d  =  + ;  lir  [  3  ;=  ,
lin  [  dT  )  =  O+  if  lim  +  x 
x  l**  -Pi  X  .p)
x -xx  dTi  xx  -x
Given  the  above  properties,  A's  indifference  curve  takes  the
shape  shown  in  fig.l.
What  about  the  implication  of  changes  in  e  on  the  position  of
the  curve  ?  Let  us  take  the  following  two  derivatives:
(14a)  ne  +1  )  X  T  +  Le  =
Oe  - L  Tr - Lx
1(5a)  an  ox  =  ox  x+  x
x  <  0  x  <  +dx
>  O  x  > x  +  dx
(15a)  - ]ae  xx  de  e  &P  X  aPae
(15a)  can  be  rewritten  as  follows:
38dLa)  - {  - Ti-  L  )  x  [xx - LJ  )  ]  -[e  +
+  -T  3  - rLX  xe  Tn  L
x  x+ dx,  xL  xx)  is  concerned,  we  have:
o+  }
[  (  - L  r-Lne  > °  , 
We  note  that  under  previous  assumptions  (16a)  is  surely
de
negative  for  x  E  (0  ,  x  +  d  ):  i.e.  it  requires  that  the
**
derivative  be  defined  "locally"  around  x  As  far  as
x e (  +  dx  ,  x +  dx)  is concerned, we have:
OT
939
>  0  viceversa
At  this point,  it  is worth noting that(15a)  with  a  negative
sign  can be interpreted as the derivative (with respect  to  9)  of
the  marginal rate  of substitution MRSnp,  :
MRSCp  I  --  I  x  =  - f
9T
According to  the  Spence-Mirrlees  sorting  condition  ,  the
OC  MRSnP  T)
positivity of  constitutes  a  sufficient  condition
Ge
for  a separating equilibrium.  It  follows  that within our  framework
39we  require  that  <  O,  which  in  turn  means  that  the
we
following  conditions  must  be  simultaneously  satisfied:
nxx  e +  xe>0  '  [xx  Lx  +  ["x-  Lx)  >  0
It  can  be  shown  that  a  sufficient  condition  that  satisfies  the
above  requirement  is  :
xe  Lxe
(18a)  > 
XX  XX
In  short,  when  e  increases,  A's  indifference  curve  shifts  to
the right;  it  will be  flatter  for x e  (0  ,  x  +  dx  );  and  if
(18a)  holds,  steeper for x e  ( x  + dx  ,  x  +  dx  ) as  shown  in  the
(discrete) diagramatic  representation provided  in  fig.2.
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Technical  and Institutional Innovation  in a  Bureaucratic Setting:
U.S.  Land Conservation  Policy  and the Conservation  Reserve
by
C. Ford Runge and  Vernon W. Ruttan**
In this paper, we develop an explanation of the current problems of the
Conservation Reserve as an application of the theory of induced technological
and institutional  innovation. The  Conservation  Reserve  is  argued  to be  an
institutional response  to market failures  affecting  soil and  water  resources,
which could itself be improved  through the application  of new soil-mapping
technology.  Resistance  to  the  use  of  this  technology  in  public  agencies
illustrates  the  difficulties  of bureaucratic  decisionmaking.  However,  with
appropriate  changes  in incentives,  these problems can be overcome.
A  belief that  the application  of science  to the  solution  of practical
problems  represents  a  sure  foundation  for  human  progress  has  been  a
persistent  theme in American intellectual and economic history.  During the
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Vernon W. Ruttan is Regents Professor in the Department of Agricultural and
Applied Economics and in the Department  of Economics and Adjunct Professor
in the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public  Affairs,  University of Minnesota.2'
two decades following  World War I,  this belief was seemingly confirmed by
the dramatic association between the progress of science and technology and
rapid  economic  growth.  Since  the late  1960s  however,  a view  has emerged
that the potential consequences  of the power created by moder  science and
technology  are  obviously  dangerous  to the  moder  world and  the future  of
humankind.  The result  has  been  to  seriously  question  the  significance  for
human welfare of scientific progress, technical change, and economic growth.
The application  of science  and technology  to the solution of problems is
increasingly  regarded  as the source of even more intractable problems.
(Crouch,  1990;  Batie,  1990).
Concern About  Resources  and the Environment
Before turning to the specific issue of land conservation policy it may
be useful to provide some historical perspective on the issues of technological
change, resource management, and the sustainability of agriculture  systems as
these issues have evolved in the United States.  We are, in the early  1990s, in
the midst of the third wave of social  concern since World  War II - and  the
fifth since Malthus - about the relationship between natural resources and the
sustainability  of improvements  in human well being (Ruttan,  1971;  1990).
The first post-war wave of concern,  in the late  1940s and early  1950s,
focused primarily  on the quantitative  relations  between resource  availability
and  economic  growth  - on  the  adequacy  of land,  water,  energy  and  other3
natural  resources  to  sustain growth.  The  reports of the President's  Water
Resource  Policy  Commission  (1950)  and  the  President's  Materials  Policy
Commission (1952)  were the landmarks  of the post-war resource assessment
studies generated by this wave of concern.  The response to this first wave of
concern was technical  change.  A stretch of scarcity, accompanied  by higher
prices, has so far induced the new knowledge  and new technologies  needed
to locate new deposits, promote substitution, and enhance productivity.  If the
Materials  Policy Commission  were writing  today it would  have  to conclude
that there has been abundant evidence "of the non-evident becoming evident;
the expensive  becoming  cheap; and the inaccessible  becoming accessible."
The second wave of concern occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
In this second wave the earlier concern with the limits to growth imposed by
natural resource  scarcity was supplemented by concern about the capacity of
the  environment  to assimilate  the  multiple  form of pollution  generated  by
growth.  An intense conflict was perceived between the two major sources  of
demand  for resource  and environmental  services.  One source was the rising
demand  for environmental  assimilation  of residuals  derived  from growth  in
commodity  production  and  consumption  - asbestos  in  our  ventilation,
pesticides in our food, organic and chemical wastes  in our water and smog in
our  air.  Another  source  of  concern  was  the  rapid  growth  in  consumer
demand  for  environmental  amenities  - for  direct  consumption  of
environmental services - arising out of rapid growth in per capita income and4
high income elasticity of demand for environmental  services.  These included
access to natural environments  and freedom from pollution and  congestion -
for  clean  water,  clean  air,  clean streets,  and  for  safe  food.  The  primary
response to these concerns has been an attempt to design local institutions to
force incentive compatibility between individual firms and other organizations
to bear the  costs from externalities  generated  by commodity production and
consumption  - to  make  the  polluters  pay.  Among  the  landmarks  in  this
second  wave  of  concern  were  the  Resources  For  the  Future  studies  of
material balances (Kneese, Aynes, D'Arge, 1970) and the series of studies that
were published under the imprimatur of the Club of Rome (Meadows et al.,
1972).
Since  the  mid-1980s  these  two  earlier  concerns  have  been
supplemented  by  a  third.  The  more  recent  concerns  center  around  the
implications for environmental  quality, food production and human health of
a series of environmental changes that are occurring on a transnational scale -
issues such  as global warming, ozone  depletion, acid  rain and others.  The
institutional  innovations  needed  to respond  to these  concerns  will be  even
more difficult to design.  They will, like the sources of environmental change,
need  to be transnational.  Our experience with attempts to design incentive
compatible transnational  institutions such as the Law of the Sea Convention,
or  even  the  somewhat  more  successful  protocols  on  reduction  of
chlorofluorocarbon  (CFC) emissions,  suggests that the  difficulty of resolving5
free-rider  and  distributional  equity  issues will impose  severe  constraints  on
how  rapidly  effective  transnational  institutions  to  resolve  these  new
environmental  concerns  can be put in place (Runge,  1990).
It is important  to note that with each new wave  the earlier concerns
have  re-emerged  as  part  of  the  new  resource  and  environmental  policy
agenda.  Thus  the  concern  with  material  resources  re-emerged  along  with
concern  about the spill-overs from agricultural  and industrial intensification
in the early 1970s.  And both earlier concerns emerged  again, along with the
transnational  resource  and  environmental  issues,  as  a part  of the broader
resource and environmental  policy agenda  of the late  1980s and early  1990s.
The issue of soil conservation was a prominent issue in the first post-war wave
of concern.  During the second wave  the concern was broadened  to include
related  issues  such  as  selenium  contamination,  groundwater  pollution,
salinization  of irrigated  lands  and  a number  of other off  site  effects.  The
significance  of these second wave  concerns for the third wave  of concern on
which  attention  has  now  been  focused  is  that  failure  to  achieve  effective
institutional  arrangements  for the management  of soil and water resources
will make  it more  difficult to respond to the changes  in land and water use
that may be  induced by global climate change.  As each  of these waves  has
come ashore, the tide of public awareness has grown stronger, so that today,
environmental  issues  are  a central  and  consensus concern  in all  developed
countries, and a growing  issue in many developing ones.6
Induced  Innovational Institutional Design
We  view the emergence  of the land and water  conservation  issue  as
arising out of two major  forces  - one  arising  from  the supply  side and  the
other from the demand  side of the  "markets" for technical  and  institutional
change.
The supply  side forces  arise  out  of the intensification  of agricultural
production.  This has  had two  implications  for conservation  policy.  On the
one hand it has enabled economies such as Italy and the United States to pull
agriculture off the most obviously unproductive  lands - the hill and mountain
areas  of  Italy  and  the  pine  barrens  of  the  Upper  Midwest  (Goc,  1990).
Farming has been concentrated  on the more productive  soil resource areas.
But  in  those  areas  where  farming  has  been  intensified  the  additional
throughputs  - fertilizers,  pesticides,  animal manures  - as well as production
practices  associated  with  the  management  of land  and  water  have  led  to
growing recognition that lands that are high or low in productivity may or may
not be  high or low  in vulnerability to environmental  changes.  Some of the
gains that should  have been realized  by the shift  of agriculture  to the more
productive resource areas have been dissipated by a failure  to recognize  that
lands  that  are  high  in  productivity  may  still  be  quite  vulnerable  to
environmental  damages,  especially  erosion and groundwater contamination.
The demand  side forces  arise  as a consequence  of economic growth.
As per  capita  income  has  risen  the  income  elasticity  of demand  for  the7
commodity  components  of  consumption  has  declined  while  the  income
elasticity of  demand  for the directly  consumed  environmental  amenities  -
clean  air,  clean water,  clean  streets,  unpolluted  beaches,  the protection  of
endangered species and environments - remains high.  The effect has been to
create  intense  competition  for  the  use  of  natural  resources  and  natural
environments  - between their use  as  inputs  into agricultural  and  industrial
production,  and their use as directly  consumable  environmental  amenities.
The effect has been to induce a call for new technologies to relieve the
stress  arising  out  of  competition  for  the  use  of resources  as  inputs  into
material  goods production and  as directly  consumed  amenities.  It has  also
induced  a call  for new  institutions to  manage  the conflicts  over the  use of
resources  (Bromley,  1990).  For example,  how much of the old growth forest
in the Pacific Northwest will be reserved as habitat for the northern spotted
owl and  how  much  for  production  of forest  products?  In the  case  under
consideration here,  how much  of the land base of the United  States will be
reserved  as  grassland  and  wildlife  habitat  or returned  to  forests,  and  how
much  will  remain under  intensive  modern  cultivation?  In addition  to the
broad issue of "how much land?" public policy must also consider which lands
should be reserved, and the related question, "for  how long?"
In historical work  on these issues, one author (Ruttan) has employed
an  "induced  technical  change"  perspective  - in which  (a)  the  direction  of
technical  change  is induced  by  changes  in  relative  resource  endowments,8
interpreted through relative factor prices and (b) the rate of technical change
is  induced by the  growth  in product prices relative  to other products  and in
relative  product  prices relative  to  factors  (Hayami  and  Ruttan,  1985).  In
extensions of this work, the other author (Runge,  1987) has argued that where
prices fail to signal relative scarcity, society may still adopt technologies which
conserve  on scarce  factors  of production.  The  way  in  which  this generally
occurs  is  that  institutional  innovations  (eg.  regulations  on  groundwater
contaminations)  respond  to  market  failures,  resulting  in  reductions  in
environmental damages.  Such regulations alter the relative value attached to
scarce  resources  (e.g.,  clean  water)  and  thus  trigger  a  new  round  of
technological innovations (e.g.,  conservation tillage) designed to conserve on
the scarce resources.
Throughout  the history of soil and water conservation  policy, market
failure  has  been a prevalent  theme.  Institutional innovation has often been
a key factor in changing the technologies used for agricultural production.  In
the Dust  Bowl  period,  for  example,  the  failure  of the  market to signal  the
depletion  of  soil  and  water  resources  ultimately  triggered  a  legislative
response,  enabling  county-level  shelterbelts  and  soil and water conservation
projects,  in which institutional  innovations  created  new incentives to change
the methods of agricultural production (see Goc,  1990).  In the 1950s, the Soil
Bank program removed  tens of millions of acres from production, in part in
response  to  overproduction,  and  in  part  due  to  environmental  concerns.9
Today,  the  rising  awareness  of  continuing  market  failures  in  production
agriculture  has  again  led  to  calls  for  institutional  innovations  to  bring
environmental factors into the calculations  of farmers  - to "internalize" these
considerations  in everyday farm-level  decision making.  This paper considers
the opportunities  and obstacles  for this process of institutional innovation.
We should emphasize that our interest in the theory and the empirical
analysis  of induced  institutional  change  does not  arise  out of idle  scientific
interest.  Our  concern  is  to  use  the  knowledge  of the  past  to  direct  the
allocation of resources to scientific and technical research and to institutional
reform  and  design.  However,  it  is  important  to  emphasize  that such  new
reforms and designs are not frictionless.  The problems of implementing new
institutional approaches  are many.  These problems have even been formally
designated  as "nonmarket failure"  or "government  failure"  (Wolfe,  1979).
The value of social science knowledge (as well as knowledge in related
fields such as law and administration)  is that it should permit us to substitute
this knowledge  for trial  and  error in  institutional  design.  Another  way  of
making the same point is that it should permit us to shift the supply curve for
institutional  change  to  the  right,  by  improving  the  efficiency  with  which
institutions respond  to the problems of moder  society,  notably the problem
of environmental  degradation.
Opportunities for Improved Institutional Design10
We  have  noted  that  market  failures  are  typical  of  soil  and  water
resource  use,  and that institutional  reforms  have been important  factors  in
raising the implicit value of soil and water resources in agriculture.  We  now
consider  one of the most important  recent efforts  to raise these values,  the
Conservation  Reserve  Program (CRP).  The CRP was  developed  as part of
the Conservation Title of 1985 Food Security Act, and has as its objective  the
retirement  of 45  million acres  of "fragile" farmland.  Thus,  the question  of
"how much?" of the land base of the U.S. should be reserved has already been
answered,  at  least  provisionally.  What  is  much  less  clear  is" which  lands
should be reserved?", and the related question,  "for how long"?
The CRP is an induced institutional innovation which explicitly raised
the  value  of  lands  designated  as  worthy  of  retirement  from  agricultural
production by offering payments to  farmers to convert these land  uses from
active cultivation of "program crops" to grasses and forest plantings.  In what
follows, we shall argue that the CRP has drawn attention to the need for new
tehnologies  which  would  allow  the  implementing  agencies  to  determine
which  lands  to retire  and for  how long.  While  the CRP  has also  induced
some  attention  to  new  technologies  at  the  farm  level,  we  are  primarily
interested  in the  incentives  for  public use  of new  technologies  in order  to
improve  upon the institutional  innovation  itself.  The technologies we  shall
focus  on are a variety of information retrieval and mapping techniques  that
allow  "targeting"  of various  land  types.  Basically,  these  technologies  resultfrom  the  application  of  increasingly  sophisticated  land-mapping  methods
which  allow  soils  to  be  distinguished  according  not  only  to  their  relative
productivity, but also their relative vulnerability to environmental  damages,
including but  not limited  to  erosion  potential.  In order to  appreciate  the
significance of using this technology to target these different land types, some
explanation  of the failures of the current  CRP program  is necessary.
The CRP has as its primary objective the temporary retirement of land
through voluntary ten year bid contracts,  in which  landowners with  eligible
acres (previously cropped land designated  as highly erosive)  are paid rent by
USDA to convert it to conservation uses, such as grass and forest cover, for
which USDA may share the costs.  At the end of the ten year contract,  the
status of the land is uncertain. It may return to active production or Congress
may seek to extend  the program in some form.
The CRP currently has enrolled 32 million acres, and has  a goal of 45
million,  although  appropriations  have been  frozen  in  light  of a number of
serious problems, not least of which is the waning popularity at the farm level
of keeping  land out  of production  as commodity  prices have strengthened.
These problems were predicted at the inception of the program (see Taff and
Runge,  1987,  1988).  Farmers were asked  to "bid" how much they needed to
be paid in per-acre rent to remove the land from production.  Even in the low
commodity  and land  price  environment  of the  mid-1980s,  these  bids were
pushed  up by  the  high  levels  of  acreage  retirement  then already  in force,12
together with the fact that the CRP reduced farm base, and thus eligibility for
future deficiency payments.  Combined with an administrative  imperative to
get  as many acres  into the CRP  as possible, the accepted  bids  substantially
exceeded  market rental values in many areas, adding hundreds of millions of
dollars  a year to the cost of the program.  In  1989, the General  Accounting
Office  (GAO) confirmed  this design flaw,  noting that:
CRP  costs  could  have  been reduced  by about  $300 million  a
year with minimal impact on the benefits achieved....  USDA's
bid acceptance process was not competitive but was essentially
an offer system wherein CRP payment rates frequently were set
much higher than local cash rental rates to induce  enrollment
in areas  with large amounts of eroding land.....  In many parts
of the country, this process  resulted  in CRP rental  rates  that
were 200 to 300 percent higher than local cash rental payments
(U.S. GAO, 1988, p.4).
In  addition to its excessive  costs, the design of the CRP has failed  to
make use of information available  to USDA to target lands most in need of
retirement.  Despite  massive  computerized  information  gathering  exercises
(Natural Resource Inventories) conducted by the federal government in recent
years  to  determine  the  vulnerability  of  various  land  categories  to
environmental  damages, this information has not been applied systematically
to  distinguish  the  vulnerable  lands  that are  low  in productivity  (and  thus13
relatively  inexpensive  to retire from  production)  from  those that are highly
productive and/or not vulnerable at all.  The push to enroll acres dominated
all other considerations,  especially at the outset of the program.
Consequently, lands  have been retired that are quite productive,  but
not as  vulnerable  to erosion  as many  others,  raising  the costs  of the  CRP
program  and  undercutting  U.S.  agricultural  competitiveness  without
maximizing  environmental  benefits  (Taff,  1989).  At  the same  time,  much
highly  vulnerable  land,  as  well  as  land  subject  to  problems  unrelated  to
erosion  (such  as groundwater contamination)  have  not been targeted  at all.
As the GAO report noted:
USDA could have improved the effectiveness of the program by
targeting  cropland  eroding  at  the  highest  rates.  Although
USDA officials  have stated that reducing  soil erosion was the
primary  objective  the  CRP,  program  managers  chose  not to
focus  on  the  land  experiencing  the  worst  soil  losses.  As  a
result, only  about 30 percent  of the most highly erodible  land
is now enrolled in the CRP.  USDA could also have improved
the effectiveness of CRP by targeting cropland that contributed
most to surface water  and groundwater  contamination  (GAO,
1989, p. 3).
A  basic  targeting  model  distinguishing  vulnerable  from  productive
acres,  such  as  the  one  employed  in  Minnesota  to  develop  state  land14
retirement  objectives  (Larson,  et  al.,  1989),  could  have  saved  the  federal
government  billions  of  dollars  both  by  lowering  CRP  bids  and  freeing
productive,  nonvulnerable  lands from  retirement,  so  that it is  available  for
low-cost  production.  Such a model is described in Appendix  1.
In sum, the institutional innovation of the CRP has raised the value of
soil  and  water resources,  but has itself been  less efficient  than it could  be.
Market failure has been met with institutional innovation, but this innovation
has manifested a form of "nonmarket" or "government failure" (Wolfe,  1975).
The  result  is  to  draw  attention  to  the  potential  role  of  new  applied
technologies  in correcting  many of the problems  of determining which lands
to retire, and for how long.
Bureaucratic Inertia
The essential difficulty in applying such methods to improve the CRP
is  a willingness  on the  part of the responsible  agencies  to  overcome  their
resistance to newer, more accurate methods of land targeting.  In part, this is
simply because  the Soil  Conservation  Service  (SCS) of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture  has grown accustomed  to the use of "T-values," the traditional
method of determining soil lost to erosion, and would prefer to keep on using
this approach.  Yet much research in soil science, the bulk of it supported by
grants  from  USDA  itself,  has  criticized  this  approach,  and  called  for  the
application of methods similar to those proposed above (Larson, et al., 1988).
What  is  needed  is  the  development  of  incentives  internal  to  this15
bureaucratic  structure  that will  motivate  the adoption  of the new  targeting
methods.  One such incentive  is, obviously, the instruction .of the Secretary of
Agriculture.  This  is  less  likely  to succeed,  however,  than  more  systematic
efforts  by  the  Secretary  to  reward  the  application  of  the  technologies  by
improving on the resources available to county, state and Federal SCS offices,
together with instructions  to use  it.  Because  of the gains available  on both
environmental  and  competitiveness  grounds,  we  believe  that  the  current
Secretary may be so disposed.  By increasing modestly the resources available
to SCS,  it may be possible to achieve  considerable  efficiencies  in the CRP,
ultimately  improving not  only the impact of the program on environmental
quality, but reducing its overall  cost to taxpayers.
Such  an  improvement  is  consistent  with  the  theory  of  induced
institutional  innovation  that  we  have  outlined.  More  importantly,  it  is
consistent with the broad demands for government  responsiveness  to issues
of environmental  quality.  In this sense we believe it shifts the "supply curve"
of institutional  change  somewhat  down  and  to  the  right  by  lowering  the
marginal  costs of conservation  policy to society.REFERENCES
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No.  1, pp. 107-140 (1979).Appendix  1A  B«A««f  *WW«W«MJ^J«J^&«  approach  *->">  *argl  *  « r  Iship  of these categories to soil conservation A new  approach  to  marginal  and farm program  policy is  as follows:
agricultural  land classification  nual commodity program set-aside because
of erosion risk, which would also maximize
G.  A.  Larson,  G.  Roloff, and  W. E.  Larson  foregone  crop production.
W RP land should be used for produc-
ABSTRACT: A state-funded land retirement program (Reinvest in Minnesota)  was initiated  tion because the land is  productive and poses
in 1986 to help control  soil erosion, improve water quality, and enhance wildlife habitat.  little  erosion  risk.  Public expenditures  for
These specific objectives and  a limited acreage  goal  suggested the need for an innovative  erosion control  practices,  therefore,  would
method to classify marginal  cropland. Soil productivity (PI) and erosion resistivity (RI)  be minimized.
indexes developed from the Soil Conservation  Service National  Resources Inventory and  1  NRNP land should be enrolled in the
SOILS-5 data bases are  combined in a two-way classification  to allow the distinction of  federal  Conservation  Reserve  Program  or
four land classes. Non-productive and erosion-prone  lands identified by the method are  RIM conservation reserve because an erosion
targeted  for program enrollment. Local soil conservation officials developed a final list  risk is present and the land is inherently un-
of eligible soil map units based on their knowledge of local soil and topographic condi-  productive, thus minimizing its  usefulness
tions. Results to date suggest that this land classification  system has been succeful because  for annual commodity program set-asides or
local input is accommodated, eligibility can be changed depending on acreage  or budget  crop production.
constraints, and it has the flexibility to complement federal farm policy.  '  RNP land should be discouraged  from
program  participation  because  the  land
ONSERVATIONISTS  have  long  held  the state, the total would exceed 6.8 million  poses  little erosion  risk and is not produc-
that a balanced soil protection program  acres of cropland.  Using the land capability  tive  for  annual  commodity  program  set-
should include retirement of marginal crop-  classification system to arrive at the 2.5-mil-  aside purposes.
land  as well  as  the use of erosion control  lion-acre goal would require restricting the  The size  of the respective quadrant  can
practices. With  passage of the Reinvest  in  use of certain subclasses, thereby penalizing  be adjusted based  on program  funding  or
Minnesota bill in 1986, the Minnesota  legis-  certain areas of the state. For example, sub-  acreage goals. For example, if limited funds
lature made available  funds to implement  class (s) soils of outwash  plains and glacial  were available for long-term cropland retie-
a major, state-funded  land retirement pro-  beach ridges located in central,  west central,  ment, a 25%  breakpoint could be used (Fig-
gram (1). Until then, funding in Minnesota  and northwestern  Minnesota,  respectively,  ure 2).  This narrows the zone of nonproduc-
was limited to  application  of erosion con-  would be omitted if a subclass (e) weighted  tive/nonresistant land, focusing attention on
trol  and water quality practices.  priority were adopted.  These areas, if omit-  more critical areas. Additional land would
During debate of the RIM bill, supporters  ted, would severely restrict development of  then be available  for other categories.
estimated that 2.5 million acres of marginal  a comprehensive  resource  protection pro-  We adopted  a  25%  criterion  for water
cropland should be retired for a minimum  gram.  erosion  and a 10%  criterion for wind ero-
of  10 years through a conservation  reserve  Consequently,  a search began for a new  sion.  We used a smaller criterion  for wind
to  benefit  erosion  control,  improve  water  way to identify marginal cropland. Methods  erosion to achieve parity between water and
quality, and enhance wildlife habitat. These  under development at the University of Min-  wind erosion  acreages.  Using these break-
specific objectives,  the limited acreage goal,  nesota Departments of Agricultural and Ap-  points,  Minnesota's  23  million  cropland
and other factors discussed  by  Roloff and  plied  Economics  and  Soil  Science  were  acres were categorized  as follows:  NRP,  4.6
associates (3) suggested the need for an in-  chosen for further review.  million acres;  RP, 11.5 million acres:  NRNP,
novative  approach  to classifying  marginal  2.3 million acres; and RNP 4.6 million acres.
cropland.  NRI  and  soil interpretation  records  (SCS
National Resources Inventory data (7) for  Soil productivity  (PI)  and erosion resis-  SOILS-5) data include soil information and
Minnesota indicated that the land capability  tivity (RI) indexes (3) were selected for clas-  environmental  factors  from  the  erosion
classification system (6) was too broad to be  sifying marginal cropland in the RIM con-  equations. We used these records to generate
used solely for the RIM conservation  reserve.  servation reserve and provide a strategy for  the data  necessary  to establish the PI and
For example, if land classes III and IV were  directing soil conservation  and other farm  RI quadrants and associated soils and acre-
combined  with classes  VI through VIII  in  program funds (4, 5). Land parcels (or soil  ages  (3).
classes)  are  categorized  into  one  of  four  Figures 1 and 2 suggest abrupt boundaries
C. A. Larson is a program specialist  with the  quadrants, according to each parcel's posi-  between the quadrants. In theory this is  con-
Board of  Water and Soil Resources, Minnesota  tion along the PI and RI gradients.  If break-  ceivable.  In reality,  it is not possible because
Department of Agriculture, St. Paul, 55107.  . points are assumed at 50 % of the PI and RI  soils and landscape features occur in a con-
Roloff is a graduate  student In the  Dsep  mt  populations,  the diagram  consists  of four  tinuum.  NRI sampling frequency and spa- of Soil Science, University of Minnesota. St. Paul,
55108, on leave from  the Universidade Federal  more or less equally sized subsets (Figure 1).  tial variability of soils also introduce error.
do Parana,  Brazil. W  E. Larson is  a professor and  The upper left quadrant might be thought  For example, if NRI points were located in
head of the Department  of Soil Science. Univer-  of as having a high-risk (nonresistant to ero-  a cropland field with short, unsheltered dis-
sity of Minnesota. This article is a contribution  sion) landscape with productive soils (NRP  tances, an unproductive soil with a fine sand
from the Board  of Water and  Soil Resources. St.
Paul, Minnesota 55107 and the Department  of  lands). The upper right quandrant includes  surface layer might be indicated  as having
Soil Science. University of Minnesota, Minnesota  low-risk  (resistant  to  erosion)  landscapes  an RI  approaching  1.0-resistant  to wind
Agricultural Experiment Station, Paper  No. 15.  with productive soils (RP lands). The lower  erosion.  Conversely,  the same soil  at loca-
702. The authors  thank C. F Runge and S.  I. Taff  left includes high-risk landscapes with non-  tions with longer unsheltered distances may
for their participation  in the preliminary  discu-  productive soils  (NRNP lands).  The lower  be indicated as nonresistant to erosion and
sions that led to this proiect and H.  R.  Finney
for his suggestions during the preparation  of this  right includes low-risk landscapes with non-  eligible for program enrollment. Therefore.
manuscript.  productive soils (RNP lands).  The relation-  if used on a multicounty or state basis where
eprnnted  from  tt  Journal of  Soil and Water Conervalion
January-Febnuary  19M.  Volume  43.  Number I
Coopyignt  e  19U Soil and  Water  Conervation Societya sufficient population of slope lengths and  0.0  RI  1.0  from erosion." The PI portion of this defini-
unsheltered distances exist,  the RI concept  o  tion  refers  to  inherently  unproductive,
is more accurate.  Nonresistant  Resistent  which is defined in the rules as a condition
Limitations of the PI concept must also  ^  productiveen  (NRP) land  (RP) land  that exists when "the soil properties of avail- be considered.  As  developed,  PI correlates  able water capacity,  bulk density and  pH
best with established  yields of deep-rooted  commodity  crop  in the uppermost  100 centimeters  of a  soil
crops  grown on well-drained  mineral soils  program  production  are  present so that an unfavorable  rooting sel-aside with  slopes  of  6%  or less.  Organic  soils,  . 50%  environment  exists."  Significant  potential
eroded  soils,  and  the  effects  of slope  and  Nonresistant  Resistant  soil productivity  loss  refers  to the  RI  con- nonproductive  nonproductive potentially lower  infiltration  on crop  pro-  (NRNP) land  (RNP) land  cept. This is defined in the rule as a loss that
duction  also must  be considered.  Conservation  Exclude  from  may occur in a short time unless manage-
Although  initially  introduced  here  as  a  reserves  program  ment  measures  are initiated to control  soil
source of error,  the fact that soils occupy  a  (CRP and  coverage  erosion.  The  method  of  calculation  con-
continuum  on  the  landscape  and  exhibit  RIM reserve)  bines the rating of a soil as a rooting envir-
spatial  variability  represents  a  strength.  50%  onment with landscape characteristics that
Flexible adjustments to PI  and RI  are pos-  represent  erosion potential."
sible.  Figure 1. Land associated with soil conservation
For these reasons,  local knowledge of soils  nd  fa  prgrams.  defiitions reveals some erosive (e), droughty
and landscapes must be reflected in a revi-  (s), and wet (w) soils. Wet soils require spe-
sion process.  Conservation districts have an  cial consideration.  As they relate to PI and
opportunity  to  develop  a  list of  soil  map  0.0  RI  1.0  RI, wet soils are not marginal because of ex-
units based on  a proposed  NRNP soils  list  S  cess water. Those that are marginal have a
developed by the Minnesota Department of  poor rooting environment  because of  bulk
Agriculture in cooperation with the Univer-  density or pH. Furthermore, undrained wet
sity  of Minnesota Department of Soil Sci-  soils probably have not been  cropped  con-
ence and the Soil Conservation Service (3).  sistently enough to qualify for the RIM pro-
Tables  1 and 2 are examples of a proposed  gram,  which  requires  that  enrolled  land
NRNP soil list. Column 3 in each table, "LS"  5.  50%  must have been cropped for 2 of 5 years dur-
(Table  1) and "U' (Table 2),  relate to the RI  ing the 1981 to 1985 period. In addition, it
concept. The slope length and steepness (LS)  currently must be physically possible to crop
factor is the critical value in determining RI  8  - the  parcel.
for  a mapping unit  because  R,  K,  and V  Relating eligible soils to proposed parcels
(vulnerability) are  constant for a soil  in a  easy in counties with published soi  sur-
county. Unsheltered distance  (L) may also  25%  50%  veys.  The use of soil survey information also
be  interpreted  in  a similar  manner. The  provides conservation district officials with
NRNPL percentage reflects the number of  Figure 2.  Illustration of a 25%  criterion.  a  means of identifying  additional  critical
NRI  sampling  points  that  equaled  or  ex-  resource areas and prescribing appropriate
ceeded  the critical  LS  value or critical  L  land treatment.
value for a  given soil.  Map unit data can-  To help with data management, the Uni-
not be retrieved even  though they were en-  panded proportionally. Consequently, a par-  versity  of Minnesota  Soil  Science Depart-
tered on  NRI  recording  forms. This  leaves  tial list  of soil series  equals total  cropland  ment has developed digitized  soil survey in-
series  as the  interpretive  unit.  Landscape  acreage.  formation systems, which include software
values, particularly LS, are useful  in deter-  With comparative ease, a knowledgeable  to visually illustrate eligible map units and
mining which map units of a given series are  person  using lists similar to those in tables  compute parcel acreages. At locations where
eligible for enrollment  in the RIM  conser-  I and 2 can develop a complete list of eligi-  detailed soils information  is not available,
vation  reserve.  ble map units. Conservation districts are en-  a soil scientist must classify the soils of pro-
The average county RI and PI figures are  couraged to solicit outside opinion in devel-  posed parcels  to at least the family level  of
weighted by the percentage that each series  oping a list of eligible map units. To main-  taxonomy.  With this information, eligibil-
comprises  of  total  county  cropland.  The  tain consistency among counties and to in-  ity  of proposed  parcels  can be determined
number at the bottom of the fifth column  sure that acreage  targets are not exceeded,  by comparing the soil(s) to those on an area
is the eligible acreage,  which totals 44,000  the Minnesota  Department  of Agriculture  map unit  legend.
acres (Table 1).  The RIM reserve rules pro-  approves all local  lists. Table 3 is selected soil  Although our discussion here has focused
vide that at least 50%  of a proposed parcel  map  units  from  an  approved  county  list  on  the soil component  of  marginal  land,
must  contain  eligible  map  units.  Conse-  prepared by Dakota County Soil and Water  many other factors have a bearing on parcel
quently,  44,000  acres  could  conceivably  Conservation District personnel using tables  selection.  Fisheries,  wildlife,  and  water
generate  88,000 acres of enrolled  land.  1 and 2 and a published  soil survey.  quality  considerations  must  be  included
The total cropland figure of 209,000 acres  The PI and RI concepts are the basis for  when  making decisions about parcel selec-
is based on NRI data. Due to NRI sampling  defining marginal  agricultural  land in the  tion at the local level. To alleviate concerns
frequency,  many soil series are missing from  rules  adopted  for  the  RIM  conservation  that  the inherent inaccuracy  of  NRI  data
tables  1  and  2.  Yet,  the  limited  number  reserve program. Marginal  agricultural land  when used  at a subcounty  level may  result
equals  total  cropland  acreage.  This  is  ex-  is defined in the rules as "land with cropland  in unfair allocations  to some conservation
plained by a term called "expansion factor."  soils that  are  inherently  unproductive  for  districts, RIM  conservation  reserve funding
Based on the number of times a soil occurred  agricultural crop production and subject to  was not based solely on eligible soil acreage.
on  cropland  points,  its  acreage  was  ex-  significant  potential  soil  productivity  loss  Other factors,  such  as the  extent  of lakes,
104  Journal  of  Soil and  Water  Conservationstreams, or wildlife management areas, also  lion was allocated.  In turn, 914  easements  ing the eligibility of a parcel at the time of
were considered.  will  be  conveyed  covering  22,000  acres.  enrollment. Others appreciated the oppor-
More than  100 of these easements  are per-  tunitv to enroll marginal cropland that pre-
Concluslons  manent;  the balance  are  for  10  years.  viously  had  been  protected  from  erosion.
The marginal land  classification system  The marginal  land classification  system  This point provided considerable flexibility
developed for the RIM conservation reserve  has been well  received.  Landowners corn-  for local officials to link public and private
program  has  several  advantages  over  the  mented favorably on the benefit of know-  parcels for maximum  wildlife benefits.
land capability classification  and rate of soil
loss  methods:
- The extent of eligible soils can be ad-  Table  1. Nonresistant  (to water eroion) *nd nonproductive  il  riee in Dakota County,
Minnesota.
justed on the basis of acreage  goals.  and in 
so doing, most types of soils. landscapes,  and  oil  NRNPL as a  Cropland
geographic  areas  can  be  accommodated.  Senes'  Rlt (water)  LS  PI  % of Cropland  (acres)
The  method  always  separates  the  least-  Estherville  0.769  0.099  0.452  84.6  23.300
resistant and least-productive land,  no mat-  Kanaranzi  0.525  0.071  0.651  1000  4.400
Hubbard  0.635  0.361  0.373  100.0  3,900
ter which  criterion  is  used.  Hawick  0.542  0.167  0.432  100.0  3,900
· Soil loss calculations are unnecessary.  Kingsley  0.844  0.657  0.636  82.6  4,600
Because  eligible  soil  map  units  are  Dickinson  0.844  0.145  0.599  29.5  6,100 I  Because  eligible  soil  map  units  are  0372  100.  1°300 Burkhardt  0.000  0.099  0.372  100.0  1,300
available,  the time required for determina-  Copaston  0.000  0.071  0.527  100.0  1,200
tion  of eligible areas  is  minimized.  Plainfield  0.859  0.508  0.360  100.0  1,200
There are also some disadvantages to the  Sparta  0.924  0.389  0.457  30.8  3.900
marginal  land  classification  system:  County  Average  0.696  0.070  0.758 Total Acres  44,000  209,000
>  Inherent characteristics  of NRI data  *Twenty-four additional series were recorded by the NRI but are not listed here because they do
may  create interpretation  problems,  par-  not contain NRNP  lands.
ticularly in those counties with a small crop-  tSee text  for definitions.
land  base.
,  Some  people  may  argue  that  too
much reliance is placed on the accuracy of  Table 2.  Nonresistant  (to wind erolson) and  nonproductive  oil  erie  in  Dakota County, much reliance is placed on the accuracy ofMinneeota. Minnesota.
the  Soil  Interpretation  Record  .(SCS  2  3  4  5  6
SOILS-5)  data  base.  Soil  NRNPL  as a  Cropland
The  disadvantages  are  manageable  if  Senes'  Rlt (wind)  L (fet)  PI  % of Cropland  (acres)
local users have an opportunity to revise the  Esterville  0.563  510  0.452  89.7  23,300
proposed  NRNP  soil  lists  based  on  their  Hubbard  0.633  28  0.373  100.0  3,900
Hawick  0.739  1368  0.432  64.1  3.900
knowledge  of the  landscapes and soils and  Burkhardt  0.608  510  0.372  100.0  1,300
the  use of soil surveys.  As  mentioned,  this  County Average  0.800  - 0.759
opportunity is available  and encouraged.  Total  Acres  28,663  209.000
This approach to classifying cropland cre-  'Series  not listed are  not included in the wind  erosion data pool or do not contain NRNP  lands.
ates opportunities to further implement soil  tSee text  for definitions.
productivity  and  vulnerability  concepts.
Wildlife habitat programs could  be devel-  Table 3. Selected soil map units eligible for the RIM conervation reserve In Dakota County,
oped for soils  in the resistant,  nonproduc-  Minnesota,  with acreage  and proportionate extent  of land area.'
tive category by focusing on sites with such  Map  Percent
desireable features as poor drainage  Larson  Symbol  Soil Name  Acres  of Land Area
and associates  (2) discussed  the use of pro-  7A  Hubbard  loamy  sand,  0 to 1 percent  slopes  755  0.2
ductivitv and vulnerability indexes in target  7  Hubbard  loamy  sand, 1 to 6 percent  slopes  2,090  0.6
t  . v  t  i  7C  Hubbard  loamy  sand, 6 to  12 percent slopes  936  0.3
ing state and local soil conservation  efforts.  70  Hubbard  loamy  sand, 12  to  18 percent  slopes  608  0.2
A number of  applications are  possible:  re-  8A  Sparta  loamy fine  sand,  0 to 1 percent  slopes  1,545  0.4
definition of valuesp  establishment of plan-  8B  Sparta  loamy fine  sand, 1 to 6 percent  slopes  1,690  0.5
12C  Emmert very gravely  sandy loam,  3  to 15 percent  slopes  320  0.1
ning horizons  based  on  a  local  consensus  278  Dickinson sandy loam,  2 to 6 percent slopes  4,193  1.1
concerning  allowable  soil  productivity  39C  Wadena loam,  6 to  12 percent slopes  1,350  0.4
39C2  Wadena loam,  12 to 18 percent  slopes, eroded  397  0.1
losses, and incorporation of off-site concerns  39  Wadena loam  12 to 18 percent  slopes  eroded  283  0.1 390  Wadena  loam,  12 to 18  percent  slopes  283  0.1
into the decision-making process.  A  recent  41A  Estherville  sandy loam, 0 to 2  percent slopes  3,941  1.1
report from Ohio (8) demonstrates the local  418  Estherville  sandy  loam,  2 to 6 percent slopes  6,764  1.8
42C  Salida  gravely coarse sandy  loam,  2 to 12  percent slopes  496  0.1
demand for additional methods to promote  81  Boone  loamy  fine sand, 2  to 6 percent slopes  988  0.3
and quantify  the  effect of  soil erosion  on  81C  Boone  loamy fine sand, 6 to 12  percent slopes  1,482  0.4
productivity'  81E  Boone  loamy fine sand,  12 to 40 percent slopes  618  0.2
productivity.  888C  Kingsley-Lester  complex,  6 to  12 percent slopes  1,042  0.3
Landowner  interest  in the RIM  conser-  888D  Kingsley-Lester  complex,  12 to 18  percent slopes  331  0.1
vation reserve has been enthusiastic, despite  1027  Udorthents,  wet  1,735  0.5
a strong showing for the federal Conserva-  1072  Udorthents,  moderately  shallow  389  0.1
ton Reserve Program in the state. Over 2100  'The acreage total includes all land uses: eligible cropland acreage is considerably smaller. Eligibility
of complexes (e.g., Kingsley-Lester complex) is determined as follows:  If  any member of the complex
landowners offered  nearly 60,000 acres  for  is eligible, the entire complex is eligible. Undifferentiated groups (e.g., Udorhents, wet) are elig-
the RIM  reserve  in  1986,  with  requests  in  ible because soil properties and landscape position are usually indicative of marginal agricultural
land.  Moreover,  PI and Ri concepts do not apply to these and other soils lacking specific chemical
excess of $25 million.  The entire  1986 RIM  and physical properties. A  cropping history and other factors are necessary in addition to an eligible
conservation reserve  allocation of $9.4 mil-  map  unit before  a site is  eligible  for enrollment.
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A  Case study
D. Agostini and C. Toffanin
ESAV
.ubhli.c intervention  in  economy has become  over  timp  so
Far-reaching to  the  point  of  shunting  large  economic  areas
fr  im  market's  traditional  mechanisms.  AgrigulLure  in
particular  is  one  of  the  sectors  where  direct  government
intervontion  (with  subsidies,  price  fixing  oolicies,
dumoina. tariff  barriers and  non  tariff  barriers. tax  relief
etc.  are widely  apul ied  to  protect  farmers'  income  and
un.rantee  a  certain  production level  in  a  country.
Moreover, there  is  a hout of  indirect  actions  aimed  at
Supportinq  the  agricultural  sector  - like  research  and
exol-imentatal  studies,  extension, and  traininq  of  technical
.nt.f4  - carried  out  mostly  by  government  agencipc;  and  publzc
institutes.
As  Prof.  Ruttan  says  i.n  his  book  "Aqricultural  Research
Policv",  these  institutec  are  doomed  to  undergo  radical
i<hanues  which  will  eventually  lead  to a  loss of  the  apency's
identity  and  efficiency.  This  process  is  about  to  take  place
particularly  in  those  countries  where  economic  and
tprhnological  progress  advances  at  a  fast  pace.
In  static  economic,  productive  and  social  contexts,  in
fact.  objectives  are generally  simple  (production  increase),
radical  innovations  roplacinig  existing  productive  techni ques
are  not requested,  routine  activities  prevail,  administrative
1and  Iurocratic  procedures  are simnplified  and  the organization
of  government  agencies  and  institutes  is hierarchical.
In  dynamic  contexts  on  the  other  hand,  changes
cihallenging  traditional  attitudes  and  ideas  are  radical  and
.wi+t,,  innovation  takes over  routine,  services  become  wide
ranging  and  must  be  referred  to  the  system  as  a  whole.
administrative  and  regulatory  procedure  must  take  over
lgis]  ative  ones,  functional  organization  must  take  over
hierarchical  organization,  and  the  employment  of  resources
must  be  flexible.
Monitoring  of  achievements  and  assessment  of  their
impact,  decentralization  of  tasks  and  coordination  of  the
various  stages  (nrogramming,  planning,  factual)  of  the
nqpnry '  activity  and  constructive  relationship  with
cumtomers  are  further  signif icant  aspects  o0  a
state-of-the-art  government  agency.
Keeping  these  points  in  mind,  the  Ente  di  Sviluppo
Aacricolo  del  Venato  (ESAV)  - the  Agency  for  Agricultural
Development  of  the  region  of  Veneto  - underwent  deep  and
radical  changes  based  on  the  following  two  premises:
-'  although  the  agency  is  public,  some  typically  private,
approaches  (efficiency.  achievement,  assessment)  must  be
carried  out;
- the agency  must  resemble  a  true  "enterprise"  supplying
tser vices  with  the  same  "business"  rationale  shared  by
private  companies.
2We then  analyzed three main olements:
A  - re-thinking  the Agency's  three management  functions
(pnlitiral-administrative,  operational,  technical);
R  - identifying  the means necessary  to  "build"  a  managing
ahility;
C  - decentralizing  a  complex  strucure  represented  bv  a
government  Agency  like  ours  into single business  units.
Two  considerations  must  be  mado  in  order  to  hotter
irndrirsrtand  the  project's  original  and  difficult  features
within  the framework of  the  Italian  legal  system:
1)  to  date  economic  and  business  experts  neglected  to
outline a  "management education"  plan  For  the  publiL
srtor.  We  are  beginning  independent  studies  of
theoretical  nature  on  husinsc  administration  to  he
eventually  applied  to public  enterprises.  Many  a  time
tenets  which  were  applipd  in  the  private  s-rtor  were
transferred  point  blank  in  the public  one,  disr-egarding
t-hs  fact  that  the  latter  has  specific  features  requirinq
specific  needs;
2)  Italy  has  not  realized  yet  that  government  regulations
are  not  sufficient  to  bring  about  real  and  lasting
changes  in  Agencies,  even  the  more  so  when  these
regulations  had  hmon  socially  or  economically  imposed.
Management  neerds  wide  room  of  manouvre  su  as  to
autonomously  detect  the  successful  elements  which  can
3improve  orgarni zational  efficiency  in  every  area.
A  - Management
TIe  first  innovation  in  the  recent  ESAV  regional
ropgulation  is  the  identification  of  political-administrative
m.nn.anrrjrntt  oper.ationial -orqani.  .ational  mamqenient  and
technical  management.
.')  Pnlitical-administrative  manaj.ement  aims  at  achievi.n  the
identification  of  ohjictives,  the  search  for  consensun.
and  the social  legitimization  of  the  Agency-Firm.  This
npFan.  -that  we  need  to  identify  the  society  for  which  the
agency works,  so  that  the  Administrator-businessman  can
anticipate  the  typp  of  services  needed  by the  society  in
which  the  Aqency  carries  out  its activity  and  establish
constructive  relationships  with  the people  to  whom  the
service  is  directed.
The  political-administrati vB  manaqempnt  is
performed  by  three  bodies:
the Board  of  Adminis.tration,  which  has  the  task  of
defining  the  Agency's  objectives  and  guidelines;
the  Executi ve  Committee,  which  has  the  task  of
transforming  the  gtlidulines  in  plans  and  projects  and  of
rchrecking  resultsi
- the Chairman,  who s.upervises  the  implementation  of  the
various  activities.
b)  _perOatioanl  manacement  aims  at  implementing  the
4allocation  of  resources  and  drawing  up  a  set  uf
Quidelines  rendering  the  combination  of  available
resources  as  cost-effective  as possible.
It-  main  feature  is  the  ability  to  supervise  thp
rtrolanizaitional  complexity  and  lead  the  svmtt.m  towards
nredetermined  ob ioctives.
To  this  end  a General  Direction  Office has  hPen  set  up 
ite-  task  is  to  coordinate  and  control  the  Agency's
.ictivity,  replacinc]  the  traditional  figtirp  of  enr
nircr-tor  present  in  the  Italian  public  sector.
t:)  T;lchnical  Manaement  accompl ishes  specific  tasks  o+
=risntific  and  technical  nature  with  the  aid  of  three
Deprartments  (L<l'hauol ogical  innovation,  devolopmRnt
service  and  promotion),  9  operation  units  distribuLt  d  jri
the  region  and  ,  Srientific  Technical  Committme  madet up
by five  researchers.
3  - Tlintfif-yjnq  the  means  necessar i to  br'in,  .-hni,  the
er-'v.j.s  business  manaqeinrit  hai 1 i t
Thr- fundamental  pr-erequi sitB  for  the  Agency's  overhaulina
wA.  the  need  to  operate  in  a  fast  pace  environment:
however  if  the  environment  is  straitjacketed  by  stiff  rules
and  regulations  like Italian legislative ones,  the  Aqency's
attempts  are  invariably  thwarted.
rherefore,  in  the  framing  of  the  new  Agency  law,
uartisular  attention  wa;  paid  to  operational  flexibility  in
5order- to  take  into  accourt  the  dynamic  charactceri  tics
regarding  elements  as:
- tochnology
- ctui tmers
. profe:ssional i ty
- external  relationships.
Afterr  all,  an  Aqencv's  efficiency  is  tantamouiL  tLu  i.ts
ability  to  adapt  to  the  evolution  and  changes  of  the
aLov'mentioned  factrrs  s~o  as  to  bear  them  in  mind  when
supplying  services  and  organizing  the  system.  On  the  contrary
iw  e  limit  ourselves  to  merely  renewing  parts  oa-  the
previously  Pxisting structure  without  modifying  the  core  and
th  -r  frame  of  mind,  we  succeed  only  in  rationalizinq  a  few
,i.prts  of  the  syztem  without  changing  the  substance.
Tn  this  end  the  main  overhauling  instruments  are:
1)  Analsis  of  stratpnipc  to  pursue:  in  order  to  fulfill  the
expectations  existing  in  an  advanced  economic  system  a
continuous re-thinking  of  the  services  offered  i.  of
utmost  importance;  this  task  is  accomplished  by  the
Srientific  Technical  Committee,  by  the  General  Directiun
Offire and  by  specialized  experts  as  envisaged  by  the
Agency's  overhauling  law.
2)  Human  Cesource's manaqment:  managemt  renovation  puts  in
the  forefront  the  enhancement  of  human  resources  in  a
strUctural  view  (professional  adaptati on  and
identification  of  new  professional  figures,  personnel
6distribution  accor ding  to'  its  role  and  not  its
aualifications,  greater  responsability  etc:.  and  a
motivati onnl  view  (incentives,  grater  <ctreE,;  on
cooperation  and team  work).
Thus,  we can  overcome  thu  :staff  limitations  imposed  by
govfernmenf  ]  FIi s] ati  ons  whero  employment,  uDr tfe.si rnal
advancement,  pay rolls etc.  arp  all  subject  to  stric-t
official  rules  and  regulations  uniformly  applied  to  all
systems,  efficient  and  inefficient  ones.
These  limitations  will  be  overcomed  with  the  introdu;ction
in  the  Agency  of  an  employer-employee  private  typo  nf
approach,  conce-rning  both  tho  staff  and  the
prnfessionality  which  will  be employed  in  the  Agency.  in
the Centers  and  in  the  Enterprises  distributed  in  the
regi  on.
The  Huiman  resource  project is  divided  in  the  Following  way:
a)  Fnhancement  of  mxecutive  roles,  top  and. middl =  managers,
;nd  experts  in  thp  privateu  ictor  in  relition  to  their
tasks
h)  Creation  of  a  wage  system  which  guarantees:
- equal  personnel  treatment  connected  to  it.  real
professional  contribution;
- adjustment  with  free  labour  market  wage  levels;
- identification  of  career  paths  in  accordance  with
staff  achievements  and  potential;
7Creation  of  "incent.iv  eS,"  linked  to  prrdatermi npd
objectives  and results  well  defined  both  in  the  initial
and  the  final  stage.
Tn  short,  we  are  focusing  our  attention  on  human
resources  management  as  it  represents  - in  a  service
Agency  1ike no.rs  the  most  important  succes.  factor
which can  promote  or  stultify  the  Agency's  new  policy.
Iuman  resource?.  are  the prerequisite  to  guarantee  service
quality  and  to  prnmote  the  Agency's  image  ill  its  widp
namut  of relations  with  the  external  world:  farmers,
universitios,  the  Nationial  Research  CentPr,  public
agencies, etc.
4)  M1anIaqtPmnt  cntrol and  result  assessment.
The prnblPms  that  the  control  system  has  to  +ace  stem
· f  rom  a  difficul t  i dnt  i f ication  of  the  -Feod-bark
mechanism  betw.on the  resources  employed  and  f-he  nuality
and  quantity  of  services  offered.  Italy  lacks  thle
iierFcssarv  instrumennts  which  allow to  assess  -he  results
achieved  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  effiri?.ncv  and
their  cost-effectiveness.  To  fill  this  gap  one  of  the
General  Directiir  Office  departments  will  have  thr,  task
of  controlling  and  Pvaluating  the  implementation  of
pr ojects,  with  the  aid  of  appropriate  indexes  and
parameters.
rC-  A.?ncy_ distributiton.  decentralia,  ation and  rnoperatln
The  Agency  will  undergo  a  structural  decente ali=ation
8ru~:?..  i-n  close  cooperation  with  regional,  national  and
international  institutions.
The  Agency decentralized  a  nd  distributed  i  t.s  activitv
intLi  variou,  DTepartments  Cenlters  and  Enterprises.
The  form.r  oravide  for  activities  like  resear.ch,
r';p ,c-lmntal  St. jdic_,  MovelomertiL  services  and  PromoLion;
the  Ce,'iLwtr.;  d=.a]  with  personnel  traininq  and  L!c:hnlnC
innovation  and  production.
tI'h  latter  deal  with  productive  activities,  on  thr,  ;pot
.rial  tosts and play  the  role nf  a "technological  window" for
f armeri  .
Furthermore,  in  order  to  addrpss  the  ever'el  mlni,,g:
innrovtion  features.,  the  Agency  in  an official  member  of  the
Polo  Tecnologico,  the  Padua  "gripo  i s"  and  the  Verona
'"Anrirnter"  -or thf! marketing  of  agricultural  pr uucts.
Th  Agenc's  over  huling  h.rn  briefly  descri  bd  i5
1 1i tuitd  by  external  barriers,  where  formal  and  ricid
I..d.!.;:.:a..:  hampmr  the enli'erprenvurial  and  busineks  f.att.lur-
which  should de.note a  modern  government  agency.  A1  thi  s
holds  true,  althoLugh  it  sl'uuld  not  be  forgotten  thatl  there will  always  he a  dispaiLyt  betwwn  the  public  and  th  pr-ivate
.ctlor,  .3s the former its  dl.rac:teri-.d  by greater  r-igidity in administrative  procedures and  by  the  need  of  formalizing
.dlarinij  trative policies  with  stautory  legislaf.on  withaut
h-ing  excessively  penalized  ex  post;  whtreas  private
mnnagement  offers  greater adminiistrative flexibility  but  is
9subjecL  to harsh  ex post  sanctions.
Tl'he  public  management  term  of  reference  will  not  be
r epr .,sented hy the  economic  equivalent  of  an  achievement
(t.rade?  value?  of  pr-nructs  supplied  to  the  markt'  An  it
hapDens  in  the  privat-a wsrtnr,  but by  the ability  of offerinc
servi.ces  which  can  mr.ot  thn  rcst.mer's  needs  quaiitywise  and
r..l.  irr  tywi ,t.
This  concepI-  bla-,r;d  an  ".r.rvi  rc-"  i s  revolutian.-rv  to  a
r-prta.an  extent,  if  compared  to  the  traditional  one  e:n:isting
in  Italy,  wheru  gov-rnment  regulated  offer  ar"t  csti ll  th.z
rule,  and allows  thP  pt.hlir  sector  to  open  up  to  a  managerial
view  tased  on  .a  hblJn;n?  rationale.
In  this respect  the Agency  will  have  to  nvprrnme  its
tr-.nli tional hierarchical  approrach  and  adopt  new  cooperat ion!
and  nrqanization  models both  in budgets and projects.
From planning to management  control,  from  human  rosou.rr.cP
Rnhanrrment  to inte-inal  and external  communicatiurL  systems,
th.?  Aclincy  sta-ff  members  wil 1  havs  a  chance  to  car.-v  greater
rt-eponrsabilities  based on  their results  and  not.  on  formal
a  ti  vit  is,  thereby  overcoming  the  present.  asic'ssrmen  .
tcr.i teari.  a..
'ri  implies  acquiring  profsscjional  qualities  and
e>pertise  off+red  by  the  Italiaii  market  only  to  a  limited
eKtent,  >inco  this  type  of  public  managerial  approach  is  very
much  called  for  hut  rarely  carried out  in  practice.
Ti.  order  to  oncrurage a complete overhauling  process,  a
10continuous  trajjininq  plan  will  take  placo  so as to  bring  about
a  true change  of  the  spirit and  the  letter,  and  so  as  to
a-vo.ld  'iny form  of  reffAlsal  toward  innovation.
In  conclusion,  the  projec:t  that  the  Agnrcy  h.-  hpr-
atttmoptgd  to  illui;trad1:r  implied  a  thourough  re-thinking  of
the  entire  network  of  roIationship*p  inside  and  outside  of
FSA'v,  v  nvn  the  vacuum  of  a  specific  managerial  approach
appl1  icr-bih_  tn  thpe  puh] iCr  ectur,  the  project  calls  for  the
"creation"  of;
a)  new  attitudes  which  can guarantee change:
h)  a . earch  of  synergies with external  structures;
c)  a  new network  of  xntornal  and  external  relationships.
11